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I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
In the summer of 1932, while the world's attention was focused
upon Japanese aggression in Manchuria, a border skirmish in the
upper reaches of the Plata valiey ignited a conflict which could not
be extinguished by the good offices of the Pan-American Union or the
peace-making machinery of the League of Nations.

The prize in

question, nearly one hundred and fifty thousand square miles of
savanna and swamp, would be minuscule in comparison with the
territorial acquisitions of the dictators of that era, but to the tw o
politically unstable and highly nationalistic nations contesting posses
sion, it represented strategic or economic advantages well worth
gaining.

The Chaco War of 1932-1935, pitting the predominantly

Indiana republics of Paraguay ahd Bolivia, was the first inter
national conflict in the Latin American region since the War of the
Pacific (1879-1884), and the only one to utilize relatively modern
systems of weapons and tactics.

In some respects, it represented

a 11 transplanting 11 of the trench-and-bunker warfare of the Western
Front of World War I into a tropical environment, but with a few
basic changes.
The primacy of the infantryman in what came to be a conflict
of defensive positioning and withdrawal was firmly established by

1

2

1935, despite conditions preventing fluidity of troop movement.
Heavy artillery, the ruler of the battlefield during World War I,
was conspicuous by its absence.

Hand-to-hand combat with basic

infantry weapons without artillery support for the possession of
vital strong points became the order of the day in many tactical
situations.

Thus, the exploitation of numerical weaknesses in such

situations was made impossible because neither belligerent could
concentrate enough supporting fire upon any defensive position to
create a breach in the opponent's lines for infantry assaults.

It

should not be deduced· that artillery and mortars fell into complete
disuse in the course of the war, even though the weapons employed
were a far cry from the mammoth siege artillery that battered
/
Liege or Verdun.

For the most part, the guns of the Chaco were

light in weight and caliber, operated by untutored personnel, and
limited in effectiveness by European standards.

The part played by

such weapons was overshadowed by the dominance of the rifle and
bayonet in the ground conflict, but the success or failure of both
armies in reducing fortified positions depended to a large extent on
the effectiveness of their artillery andrn:>rtar units. · It is the present
intention to examine the variety of factors bearing upon the origin,
training, reliability, and strategic use of field artillery, mortars,
and their personnel, and to show how these affected both the course
and outcome of the Chaco War

3
As a matter of historical record, a brief examination of the
reasons for the Paraguayan-Bolivian rivalry over the Chaco is in
order.

Since the crippling defeat inflicted upon Paraguay by Ar-

gentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the War of The Triple Alliance
(1 865-18 71), Bolivian ambitions concerning the creation of a sphere
of influence in the Chaco Boreal (see frontispiece map) for economic
purposes were accelerated by Paraguayan weakness at this point.
In 1855 the Bolivian Congress had proposed a port development
scheme on the upper reaches of the Paraguay River, and had passed
a legislative act to that effect in the same year, offering cash awards
and land grants to prospective settlers.

1

Paraguayan protests were

verbose but ineffectual, as the dictatorial regime of Carlos Antonio
L�pez was preoccupied with domestic revolts at that juncture, but
few Bolivian settlers braved the fever-ridden swamplands of the
upper Paraguay and the project died from lack of interest.

The

momentary tensions created by the Bolivian attempts at settlement,
and her diplomatic intransigence following the War of the Triple
Alliance left many Paraguayans with lingering doubts about the
intentions of the Altiplano republic.
Bolivian interest in the Chaco lay dormant_ for a quarter of a
century, until the disastrous War of the· Pacific which resulted in
1

Phillip Raine, Paraguay (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1956), pp. 225-27.

4
the loss of Bolivia 1 s sole link with the Pacific, the Atacama strip,
to the victorious Chileans.

Figuratively and literally cut off from the outside world,
and stung by the humiliation of diplomatic and military reversal,
Bolivian national policy turned to the one slender straw of hope
remaining, a series of river ports on the Paraguay and Pilcomayo,
capable of replacing Atacama as a commercial outlet and lessening
dependence upcn the Chilean-owned

La

Paz-Atacama railway.

To

accomplish this end, territorial claims in the area, resurrected from
ancient Spanish grants signed in
legislature in

1886,

1627,

were asserted by the Bolivian

and were formally presented to the Paraguayan

Congress in the fall of that year.

1

In

no position to confront the

Bolivians in the field after achieving a degree of recovery following
the War of

1865-1871,

the Paraguayan government indicated its

willingness to negotiate concerning the matter.
years, three separate treaties
b ut not ratified.

During the next twenty

(1887, 1894, 1907)

were negotiated

2

Neither of the national legislatures could agree upon common
boundaries or zones of neutrality, due to the lack of maps of the
Chaco and the absence of landmarks, and Paraguayan public opinion
hardened against the granting of any favorable port concessions to

1Ibid.
·
2Ibid.

5
Bolivia.

1907 saw the last attempt at serious negotiation by either

party with the Pinella-Soler protocol, which attempted to establish
a neutral zone between the two contesting powers separating their
Chaco holdings at that date.

Although arbitration commissions

composed of member states of the Pan-American Union met at
Buenos Aires (1913) and Montevideo (1928) in attempts to mediate
I
the dispute, peaceful settlement of the issue became a forlorn hope.

1

Having recovered both economic and human strength, Paraguay no
doubt felt justified in asserting her own claims to the Chaco, based
on ancestral possession by the Guaranf Indians, and in developing
the unlimited timber and grazing resources for her own benefit.

By

1928, both nations began large-scale settlement programs in the
Chaco Boreal, concentrating in the forested areas adjacent to the
two major rivers and around the major water holes, or c'.inadas.
Each constructed an irregular line of mud-walled stockades astride
the savanna ostensibly as defenses against banditry, but actually as
outposts designed to keep close watch on one another.

·Parties of

Paraguayan and Bolivian surveyors, traders, and military personnel
pushed out into the bush, frequently clashing over water rights and
boundary violations, although no official demarcation line existed.
On December 5th, 1928, a battalion of Paraguayan infantry from the

6
/

/

2nd Regiment garrisoning Bahia Negra stormed Bolivian-held Fortin
Vanguardia and held it for two months in retaliation for the Bolivian
execution of a Paraguayan trader convicted of murder by a military
court.

1

From that moment on, patrol skirmishes escalated into a

full-scale border war, not yet formal, but just as deadly.
Strength of the Combatants
In comparing the warmaking potential of Bolivia and Paraguay,
the obvious initial advantage would seem to lie with the Andean state.
Armed with a large capital surplus derived from the tin-mining industry
and accumulated during World War I, Bolivia successfully obtained
arms from abroad over a five-year period (1926-1931 ), without
disrupting the domestic sector of her economy.

In addition, private

native banking firms and several Chilean syndicates advanced liberal
loans to the government of Dr. Daniel Salamanca for military purposes.
The Bolivian .armed forces possessed far more elaborate equipment,
and outnumbered Paraguayan forces as of 1931 in terms of total
• mobilized manpower by some sixty thousand men or two hundred
thousand for Bolivia to approximately one hundred forty thousand for
Paraguay.
1
2

2

In spite of these advantages, domestic instability

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 231.

7
/

weakened the total Bolivian war effort.

The Salamanca government,

heir of the military revolution of 1930, was distinctly unpopular be
cause of increased taxes, national conscription of manpower, and
repression of interest groups opposing the war, such as the mining
unions and the Cruceros, political separatists· from the eastern
province of Santa Cruz.

Thus, segments of the population at crucial

phases of the war swung away from unanimous support of govern
mental policy.

As a result of this instability, the masses of Indian

recruits inducted into the Bolivian ground forces were frequently
deprived of logistical services in the form of adequate medical care
and sanitary engineering.

Ineptitude and profiteering at high military

and civilian levels added to the distress of the Bolivian foot soldier.
Fighting in an unfamiliar climate, and poorly lead by creole officers
who treated them with contempt, it is surprising that the moral
collapse of the armed forces which occurred in 1934 did not occur
sooner.
At the outset, prominent political and military analysts gave
odds on a Paraguayan victory which ran almost one thousand to one
against it.

These odds appear realistic in view of the fact that

national economic potential, in this case, was dependent upon an
agrarian,

11

two-crop" base consisting of cattle raising and the cutting

of quebracho wood, a critical material in the manufacture of tannin

8

extract, worth approximately two million Paraguayan pesos per year
1n combined export valuation.

1

Compared to the yearly revenue on

exported tin assessed by the Bolivian Ministry of the Interior, this
would constitute literally a drop in the financial bucket.

Because of

this limitation, equipment and supply purchases for the national armed
forces were not as elaborate as those of free-spending Bolivia during
the period 1926-1932, but were carefully laid out over a longer period
to avoid heavy foreign debts and prevent wholesale bankruptcy.

Some

Paraguayan formations, the refore, went into battle lacking needed
equipment, and the requisitioning of arms, improvisation by local
industry, and replacement with captured stocks came to be accepted
solutions for Paraguayan logistic problems.

Irrespective of these

handicaps, Paraguay did possess three attributes which outweighed
many of its physical deficiencies.

Ill-equipped as the Paraguayan

army was, it had able leadership in the person of Jos/ Estigarrikia,
a thorough knowledge of the terrain which the Bolivians did not have,
and a group sense of elkn drawn from the fact that ninety per cent
I

of its officers and men were Guarani, the predominant Indian stock
_in Paraguay, whose fighting ability.;in hlSl warfare dated back to the
time of the Spanish conquest.

In terms of lines of supply, Paraguay

fought on its home ground. close to major depots and supply points,
1Ronald S. Kain, "Behind the Chaco Dispute,
History, XLII {August, 1935 ), 4 70.

11

Current

9
and linked to the front by river steamer and three hundred fifty-nine
miles of narrow-gauge lumber railroad, mostly private-owned, but
immediately commandeered by the government at the outbreak of
hostilities.

1

Balivian supplies, on the other hand, had to be transported
down from the Altiplano via the wide-gauge railroad from Sucre to
Santa Cruz, unloaded, and moved south by motor truck, muleback,
and porters over narrow, rutted, and frequently washed-out trails.
As the battle lines shifted further north, this Paraguayan advantage
gradually decreased, but during the early stages of the war, the fact
that adequate ammunition, foodstuffs, and medical supplies were
available in quantity to the Paraguayan forces made a significant
I

difference in their defense of the fortin line against the first Balivian
offensive in 1932-1933.

However, the most significant "hole card"

in Paraguay• s hand was the relative degree of political stability
possessed by the nation itself.

The government of Eusebio Ayala,

in office since 1932·, had removed the stigma of political corruption
and party squabbles between Conservatives {Blancas) and Liberals
( Colorados) which had tainted the domestic atmosphere since the
early 1 20 1 s.

Ayala, an ex-soldier and graduate of the Colegio Nacional

Militar, was far from being the epitome of an idealistic, disinterested
1

Ibid.

10

executive (as his conduct towards General Estigarrib:ia after the war
would demonstrate), but his leadership in this time of crisis rallied
national mobilization behind a conunon cause; something which
Salamanca was totally unable to accomplish.

In the long run, we can

view the respective combat ants in an entirely different light without
recognition of basic strengths or weaknesses.

Both, in the cold light

of reality, were impoverished political entities fighting an equal
combat with limited resources; a combat which could ultimately
benefit neither and might easily ruin all parties concerned.
Pre- War Military Buildups
By 1928, the future belligerents had decisively committed
themselves to a program of gradual armaments purchasing, either
by contract as in the case of Bolivia, or by random selection from a
number of foreign corporations as did the Paraguayan government.
These contract purchases will be discussed in detail in Chapter II,
in reference to the artillery developmental schemes used by both
nations.

Purchasing of foreign-made equipment was not confined to

arms and ammunition. Quantities of uniforms, medical supplies,
motor transport, and other items were purchased along with priority
weapons, although most of these supplies were fabricated by local
industry or donated by the civilian population.

The Red Cross drives

11
/

in both nations, and the activities of the National Arsenal at Asuncion
serve as cases in point.
Expenditures of federal funds in both instances were exceptionally heavy, and, for Paraguay, proved to be a sizeable drain on
the national gold reserves.

In addition, the balance of payments for

both nations tipped from the credit side to the debit, causing cutbacks
in consumer production and driving up the cost of living in both states.
An instance of this is shown by the extent of purchases made by the
belligerents from one nation, France, during the period 1932-1933.
Bolivia received eight million francs worth of munitions during that
time, and Paraguay three million;

1

a staggering amount of debt for

even a solvent republic to incur. At an earlier date, Joseph Kreech,
the U. S. Minister to Paraguay, reported to the State Department in
a dispatch dated January 5th, 1929, that the Argentine Consul in
/
Asuncion had mentioned to Kreech that a large shipment of Germanmade munitions (including twenty-four thousand Mauser rifles), had
arrived in Buenos Aires.

This shipment was valued at over a quarter

million German marks and was consigned to La Paz.

2

After the

League of Nations Arms Embargo of 1933, many overseas munitions
firms, including several United States c;orporations, resorted to
1
2

New York Times, July 27, 1933, p. 14.

u. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations: Documents,
1929-31. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), I, 834.
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legal loopholes to fulfill previously signed contracts; actions which
led to cargo seizures and court suits in many cases.

One example of

subterfuge occurred in the delivery of four Curtiss-Wright bombers
purchased before the embargo took effect.

After reconditioning, the

company sold these aircraft to a firm of rather questionable reputation
in 1933, Tampa-New Orleans-Tampico Airways Inc., which promptly
re-sold them to Bolivia after transporting them outside the limits of

.
1
American jurisdiction.
It is not our intention here to point out the

disadvantages of such arms traffic to the belligerents or to the vendor
nations, but to indicate that such sales did exist and were the main
source of the military equipment used, especially artillery and
mortars, throughout the conflict.
Troop Deployment in the Chaco:
Lines of Communication and Retreat
The map on the preceding page indicates the major troop
concentrations within the Chaco at the outbreak of hostilities, and
examination of the key will provide a concise picture of relative unit
strength at that time.

However, it must not be assumed that these

concentrations were of the overnight variety.

While both parties had

maintained token garrison forces in the various Chaco fortines since
1928, Bali vian concentrations had increased consistently since that
date, to the extent that mobilization of an effective combat force for
immediate action was relatively simple, due to the constant state of
1

Hubert Herring, "Chaco Deadlock,
(May, 193 5 ) , 18 9-91.

11

Current History, XLII

14
readiness of the Bolivian army and its supporting arms. This
consistent 11 red alert 11 may be typified by a dispatch from the United
States charge d'affairs, at La Paz, William Trueblood, to Secretary
S t i m s o n . on June 27th, 1931, stating that the aircraft and

of State

ground crews of the Military Aviation School were being readied for
service in the Chaco, even though hostilities were not imminent.

l

Paraguayan mobilization was not quite as consistent, because of the
smaller size of that nation's military and the necessity for strict
economy in fund expenditures.

Prior to the commencement of

hostilities in 1931, she could afford to keep on active status only one
regular infantry division (of four regiments), one cavalry regiment,
and one artillery regiment, whereas Bolivia had fully mobilized six
infantry divisions (of three regiments) with supporting arms; three
of which, the 3rd, 4th, and 7th, were wholly or in part garrisoning
fortines in the Chaco.

2

1

1 An

Infantryman's War"

Even with the most modern equipment and thorough training,
tropical warfare becomes a risky proposition when the terrain and
climate are as obviously adverse as was true of the Chaco .
l

Con-

U. S., Foreign Relations: Documents, 1929-31, I, 231.

2
Antonio E. Gonz:lez, P:eparaci'bn del Paraguayyara La
Guerra del Chaco {Asunci�n, Paraguay: Editorial El Grilico, 195 7),
I, 23-24.
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sequently, the conflict took on the complexion of an old-fashioned
defensive

11

battle for position 11 , similar to the aforementioned War

of the Pacific, but employing modern weapons systems.

Both armies

possessed these as well as the somewhat dubious benefit of Europeanoriented training by way of advisory missions which by all rights
should have resulted in trench warfare on the model of the W•.:!stern
Front.

The effects of the unusual terrain, extremes of heat and

moisture, and the difficulty of cross-country movement completely
revamped the traditional doctrines of trench warfare, changing them
to fit the circumstances of the moment and the tactics used.

The

frontispiece map shows the Chaco in relief, but no map and no
descriptive phrases can adequately convey the nature of the region
or the burdens it im:?osed upon men, animals, weapons, and motorized
equipment.

As a

11

pure 11 jungle by a biological or literary definition,

it would be considered second-rate, as heavy forests occur only along

'

the riverbanks of the two primary northern branches of the Plata,
the Paraguay and the Pilcomayo.

Rather, the Chaco, geographically

speaking, is a combination of grassy savanna, heavy brushlands, and
riverbottom swamp bounded on the north by the Andean foothills
and on the east and west respectively by the two previously mentioned
rivers.

In

spite of the presence of these major streams, it is a

r egion parched by continuous drought, relieved only briefly by the
torrential rains of the winter season which overflow the rivers, creeks,

-
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and canadas (limestone depressions used as local waterholes) and
blocking overland travel on the few accessible trails for several
months out of the year.

Apart from these narrow cart trails, river

steamers, and the narrow-gauge logging railroads in the central
portion, overland movement is hampered by an -inadequate water supply
and the impossibility of traversing the inpenetrable acacia, thorn,
and palmetto scrub that line both trail and railbed.

Where a few

men might move with ease, a marching column of fully loaded
infantry or mule-drawn 75 1 s could not penetrate, on many occasions,
these "living walls", although Paraguayan columns by traveling light
could and did make long overland marches.

-

The lack of potable drink-

ing water, save for the few canadas which did not dry up in the summer
months, slowed troop movements by both belligerents and contributed
to lengthening lists of non-battle casulties from extreme thirst and
sunstroke.
The high degree of humidity, with annual temperatures during
the summer consistently over 100 degrees, sapped the energy of
the combatants, lowered their resistance to disease, and quickly
rusted exposed metal equipment, particularly fieldpiece sights,
shells, and fuse caps.

The primitive medical/ sanitation battalions

of the opposing armies found themselves hard put to cope with recurrent epidemics of malaria, scrub typhus, and dysentery which
frequently left whole regiments incapacitated.

Evacuation of wounded

17
or sick personnel could not be properly carried out due to the
inability of military ambulances to cope with roads made impassable
by trucks or marching feet.

Air evacuation was used by both sides

where landing strips could be cleared in the scrub or savanna, but a
wounded man's chances of reach ing a rear hospital alive were minimal
to begin with.

More than half of the casulties incurred by both

belligerents were non-battle, and derivatives of the inhospitable
landscape in which they fought.

Lines of communication and retreat

were limited to the few man-made trails previously referred to,
and the dubious link of air supply, which was employed here for the
first time in Latin American military history, although on a small
scale.

-

As a result, the possession of key positions along major

supply routes and strategic waterholes, as exemplified by Arce and
Canada del. Carmen, often became the focal point for full-scale tactical
operations involving entire divisions or corps.
In retrospect, the greatest burden borne by the Bolivian
ground forces in particular was not physical, but psychological.
Confronted with an alien, forbidding landscape, and bewildered by
a type of warfare wholly unfamiliar to them, most Bolivian soldiers
from the private in the front rank to the �orps comrnander in the
rear felt the tension and uncertainty common to conventional forces
fighting in a strange environment, and expressed it through irrational
operational orders, trigger-happiness in the frontline trenches, which

18
accounted for a sizeable proportion of total Bolivian casulties, and
panic in times of encirclement or retreat.

Their Paraguayan opposite

numbers had to cope with similar difficulties, but to a lesser degree.
Having an intim,ite knowledge of the terrain, and combining said £actor
/
with the Guarani propensity for bush warfare, Estigarrilba. and his

subordinates could afford to let the Chaco be their temporary 11 ally 11 ,
and not to regard it as an object of fear or scorn, as was the £ashionable custom at Bolivian Expeditionary HQ at Santa Cruz. As a
matter of record, let us make it quite clear that neither belligerent
found the Gran Chaco an easy battleground, and the difficulties posed
by nature which we have alluded to cancelled out many of the material
or psychological advantages possessed by each.

There is no question

that the conflict was a grueling one, and tested the national strength
of both parties to the breaking point.

An English journalist, visiting

the front lines in the summer of 1932, just after the outbreak of the
war, summed it up exceedingly well when he said

11 • • •

when our

ancestors inv�nted Hell, they had no knowledge of the Chaco.

11

1

1
"Verdun Over Again in El Gran Chaco," Literary Digest,
CXV (February 18, 1933), 12-13.

II.

THE STRATEGIC APPLICATIONS OF
FIELD ARTILLERY AND MORTARS
Pre-War Influences

Probably the first shots fired by either antagonist in the
Chaco came from field artillery, belying the implications that the
conflict would be fought and won with infantry alone.

A report dated

19 July 1932, from the commander of the Bolivian 4th Infantry
/
division, garrisoning Fortin Mariscal Santa Cruz, stated that the
stockade had been surrounded by three hundred Paraguayan troops
on July 15, 1932, and that the garrison was receiving consistent
artillery and mortar fire.

1

No w that the cannon muzzles had been

warmed, they would not be cold again for three long years.

Before

investigation of the direct role that infantry support arms played in
a tactical sense, attention must be turned to other considerations of
a strategic, long-range nc;1.ture.

Among these will be included

military doctrines introduced by foreign advisors to both belligerents,
pre-war field training, developmental planning prior to the conflict,
the role of logistics and reconaissance in weapons effectiveness, and
most important of all, the integration of artillery and mortar units
within the separate organizational tables of the two field armies.
l

U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations: Documents,
1932, V, 33.
19

20
The utilization of artillery and mortar in both armies came
directly under the influence of two diametrically opposed systems
that had once before clashed on a broader field of battle --- the
Western Front in World War I.

To a great degree, the belligerents

had relied upon the assistance of advisory teams or individuals from
other nations to direct re-organization and troop training since the
early 1920' s, and accordingly these brought the weight of their
professional and personal influence to bear upon infantry support
doctrine.

Because of the variety of such influences, either voluntary

or contractual in character, basic doctrine in both field armies was
a conglomeration of many strategic theories.

Two paramount

examples, one individual and the other cente red around a group,
stand out above the rest as guideposts and tradition builders for two
armed services relatively untutored in heavy weapons theory and
practice.

Bolivian artillery and mortar technique in the Chaco were
•

I

dominated from 1921 onward by the autocratic figure of an exPrussian aristocrat and Grenadier officer, Hans Kundt.

A veteran

of the Eastern Front who had risen from captain to brigadier general
in the course of World War I, Kundt had originally come to Bolivia
in 1910 as a member of an advisory team to serve as an instructor
at the National War College in

La

Paz.

After Versailles, he returned

to his "adopted" fatherland and filed naturalization papers to escape
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the Treaty clause forbidding German officers to act as military advisors
over seas.

1

A thorough-going militarist of the pre-World War I

school, Kundt can be considered responsible for the remodeling of
the Bolivian armed forces along German lines, especially in the
areas of tactical manuever and infantry support.

His command

experiences in East Prussia and Poland, fighting an "open" type of
warfare against enormous masses of Russians, had firmly convinced
him that weight of fire, not accuracy, was the predominant factor in
artillery/mortar support of assaulting infantry.

Accordingly, he

expounded the idea of the erosion of a weak point in an opposing
defensive line by massive concentrations of carefully observed
artillery and mortar fire, to destroy enemy resistance at that point
and permit assaulting infantry to exploit the breach and "fan out" •
from that point.

A descendant of the old Napoleonic concept of le

grande batterie, literally, "the great battery", this tactic was
effective enough in blasting a hole in an opposing defensive line
situated on open ground with limited entrenchments, as was the
case on the Eastern Front during World War I.

2

However, Kundt' s

proposed doctrine was extremely inflexible to the extent that it took
no account of defense lines in depth and in its emphasis on weight
1
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rather then accurate fire direct ed against frontal and flanking
positions.

1

The German artillery strategy employed on the Western

Front adopted these factors into its overall doctrine, but little
apparent attention was paid to its success by Kundt.

The price paid

by the Bolivian foot soldiers at Toledo and Nanawa was a result of
this oversight, and will be considered in detail in Chapter IV.

Kundt 1 s contributions were not, however, entirely negative.
On the contrary, his administrative ability gave Bolivian field
artillery and mortar units a proper place in the tables of organization and a definite mission to fulfill, rather than being the stepchild and whipping boys of logistics or executive authority.

In doing

so, however, battery com1nanders and rear-rank gunners alike were
penalized by the removal of initiative and their subordination to higher
authority through a complicated chain of command�

To make any

weapon effective, particularly field artillery or mortars, a degree
of personal choice must be left to those who operate and control it,
for instance, in the sighting of the piece for effective fire.

In his

passion for total discipline, Kundt did not completely destroy freedom
of action in Bolivian artillery /mortar theory, but watered it down by
tying it to a command hierarchy which could not respond quickly
enough to requests from the lower echelons under battlefield conditions.
1

Ibid.
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Thus, fire support often came too little or much too late, and the
embattled artillery received an unjust share of the criticism for
subsequent defeats.

In

sum, Bolivian infantry support doctrine as

it stood in 1932 is anal agous to a man possessing only limited
control of the vital parts of his body.

The head worked well, as

did the arms, legs, and feet, but they did not work in co-ordination
with one another.

The prime influence upon Paraguayan artillery and mortar
doctrine came from a different source, and it found fertile ground
in which to plant theoretical seeds.

Lacking excessive numbers of

fieldpieces, mortars, and related weapons, the Paraguayan forces
naturally fell back upon rapidity of movement and accuracy of fire
rather than weight, and correlated these factors with the handicaps
imposed by the Chaco terrain and climate upon an elaborate, "big
gun" establishment.

As a result, the training systems advocated

by a French military mission resident in Asunci�n from 1926 to
1929 became logical adjuncts to native "common sense" doctrines.
Composed of five officers, the advisory team concerned itself with
officer and enlisted in�truction in basic arms specialties, prominent
among them field artillery and mortar �mployment in infantry
support.

1

1

Other missions were present at the same time, but did

Ibid., II, 31-32.
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not take such a prominent role as the French.

Major Gustave

Langlois was head of the artillery/mortar training section established
at the Colegio Militar and the National Arsenal.

1

Another veteran of World War I who had worked his way up
through the ranks, Langlois saw in the untrained personnel under
his instruction an opportunity to vindicate artillery/mortar mobility
under battlefield conditions.

Previously, French artillery doctrine

had been built around the concept of the primacy of field batteries
in direct support of the infantry, reserving heavy artillery for siege
warfare or special operations.

The famous French

11

75 11 was the

prototype fieldpiece developed for such a strategy, which, however,
called for conditions of

1

1 open' 1

warfare.

The stagnation of the

conflict on the Western Front into trench war by 1916 killed off by
degrees the necessity for artillery mobility, and by the time of the
armistice weight rather than speed dominated the battlefields -0n
both sides of the line.

2

Langlois, having the opportunity to travel

extensively throughout Paraguay, realized that an impending conflict
with Bolivia would be fought along the lines of a defensive, positional
conflict similar to the model of the Western Front.

Without allud-

ing directly to the subject, he asserted.that the absence of a road
1

Ibid.
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or rail net in the Chaco and the unsuitability of the terrain would
preclude the use of heavy artillery in the conventional pattern.
Accordingly, he placed emphasis upon the direct support of Paraguayan infantry by attached pieces either in battery, section, or single
gun; able to move in pace with the foot soldier and provide support
where it was needed.

1

In addition, Langlois did not overlook the

possibilities offered by the trench mortar as an infantry support
weapon complementing field artillery, as did his opposite number
Kundt.

Here was a simple device packing the relative power of an

artillery piece, but inexpensive and easily operated by untrained
personnel.

Both belligerents used mortars extensively during the

course of the conflict, thus proving the contention that equipment
need not be elaborate to perform the desired battlefield task.

2

Mass

fire against fortified positions was not neglected by any means,
although the primary emphasis here fell upon direct, accurate
delivery of bombardment against a variety of specific objectives
across open sights rather than indirect "destruction by weight of
metal".

3

Herein lies the only weakness in Paraguayan artillery/mortar
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doctrine; namely, the exposure of gun crews to battlefield hazards.
Open-sight firing certainly possesses the benefits of accuracy and
clear observation of one I s target, but if a gun crew is made a target
in return, the value of the fire is diminished or totally lost.

This

is not to imply that Paraguayan artillerists and mortarmen were
incapable of indirect fire against unobserved targets.

The inadequacy

of observation and reconnaissance facilities as will be indicated in
Chapter IV forced the expedient of direct, exposed fire in many
instances with high personnel casulties as the result.

1

Disadvan-

tageous as this method was, it did make for keen accuracy on the
part of Paraguayan gunners and may have prevented major military
catastrophes during the course of the conflict.

At first, Bolivian

artillery crews tended to emulate their Paraguayan counterparts in
direct movement firing, but gradually lost their enthusiasm for the
practice after the disaster at Nanawa.

2

As a more concrete step,

Langlois left behind him in 1929, among other things, a simplified

/
range table (printed in Spanish and Guarani) which could be calcu3
.
lated by any literate common soldier.
Thus, in an emergency,

even regular infantrymen untrained in handling and firing an artillery
piece could operate it with a reasonable degree of efficiency.

1
2
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It might appear to the casual observer that the use of
artillery and mortars in the Chaco War was dictated by tr aditional
policies advocated by old military rivals.
assertion holds true.

To a certain extent, this

We must recognize, however, that the field of

battle in question was completely opposite from the flat fields of
Picardy or the hills surrounding Verdun where the Franco-German
contest of big gun versus big gun swayed back and forth.

The doctrine

might have been the same but the men who loaded and fired the guns
in the bush turned it in many different directions; directions not
dreamed of by the artillerists of World War I.
Field Training and Instruction

Having discussed the strategic influences imparted to infantry
support doctrine by Kundt and the French mission attention can now
be focused on the systems of pre-war field training used by the
belligerents, and the operation manuals used in such training.
Neither armed service possessed a hardened cadre of regular officers
and enlisted men adequately skilled in operating artillery and mortars
in the field, with the result that gun crews frequently went into battle
with limited firing experience and were forced to learn the hard way.
This technical deficiency can be traced _directly to the insufficiency
of pre-war instruction, and the presence or absence of illustrated
texts or manuals as instructional guides..

The lack of such essentials

28
on the part of the Paraguayan army, due to economy measures,
proved to be a definite handicap to the corps and divisional staffs
in the early stages of the conflict, not to mention the difficulties
imposed upon Paraguayan artillery and mortar crews during this
On the other side of the coin, Balivian training and field

period.

manuals, while not up to present-day standards, sufficed to provide
an initial advantage command-wise through the first offensive of
1932-33, until defensive measures not covered by orthodox considerations were encountered at Toledo and Nanawa.

After returning to formal military life in 1922, Kundt proceeded to translate the old Imperial field artillery manual into
Spanish as the basic document for Balivian infantry support doctrine.

1

Consequently, the strategic doctrines previously mentioned received
written expression, and becan"le standard operating procedure for
Bolivian artillery units in the field.

The manual covered logistical

situations, reconnaissance, maintainance procedures in the field
and in garrison, as well as a mass of technical material on weapons
operation, ballistics, and allied ordnance concerns.

2

In 1934, a

companion manual covering operations and training of mortar crews
appeared, but no pre-war manual on this particular subject had
1

Enrique Vidaurre, El Material De Guerra En La CAmpana
Del Chaco {La Paz, Bolivia�Escuela T�grafica Salesiana, 1942), pp.
228- 30 •.
2
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The 1934 manual was produced as a compendium of field

existed.

experiences designed to demonstrate the value of the mortar as an
infantry support weapon, and was published after the ouster of Kundt
as Chief of Staff.

1

In the re-organized tables of organization for the field
artillery, Kundt adopted the traditional pattern of a hierarchical
chain of command with operational responsibility vested in the corps
or d.ivisional commander according to the tactical situation being
faced, and trailing downward through the divisional and regimental
artillery organizations to the individual battery and piece. commanders.
This military "division of labor" possessed certain advantages in that
it allowed the commander of a corps or division, as the case might
be, to shift his artillery /mortar components where their weight would
be most readily felt, and permitted co-ordination of unit support
fires by a single officer.

Objections to such a system are infinite in

variety, and we shall mention only a few prominent ones in passing.
A hierarchy of this order stifles, not encourages, individual initiative
in uI1it commanders further down on the ladder or responsibility
whose needs for fire support are immediate in nature, and may be

1

Ibid; An excellent summary of these manuals and how they
influenced artillery doctrine in the Chaco can be found in Humberto
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inadequately fulfilled by waiting for orders from higher authority.
In addition, an excellent system of communication is necessary between the command center and front-line units; a system in continuous
working order and relatively foolproof.

In field training such a

communications net was simple to maintain, but in the brush and
swamps of the Chaco, it became a Herculean task to keep lines of
communication open within single regiments, much less whole corps.
In spite of the obvious fact that Kundt 1 s command system was overly
rigid and slow in its response to requests from lower echelons, it
gave Bolivian field artillery and mortars a conceptual framework
within which to expand, although it came to be greatly altered under
field conditions.

Operational experience was to be the ultimate test

of the Kundt system, as pre-war manuevers had placed consistent
emphasis on the role of artillery in support of attacks on fortified
positions.

After 1928 the artillery and mortar components of the

six Bolivian divisions gained practical experience in war games
held yearly or by consistent rotation assignment unit by unit to the
.
2
Chaco fortines.

This rotation, however, was not for the purpose

of direct on-the-scene training, but for acclimatization purposes
and to provide relief drafts for garrisons riddled by fevers and
dysentery.

3

These rotational drafts gave Bolivian artillery and

1
Ibid.
2
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mortar units a taste of the terrain they would eventually be fighting
in, and provided some opportunities for live firing practice.

An

abundant supply of practice ammunition allowed the majority of such
units to use their weapons without going through the fruitless pro
cedure of

11

dry-run 11 firing and the consistentcy of the practice mobili

zations ordered by Kundt kept both artillery and mortar units rela
tively battle-ready and prepared to depart for the front on a moment 1 s
notice.

1

In terms of formal instruction manuals and extensive pre-war
training, the Paraguayan field forces were less adequately prepared
than their Bolivian �ounterparts, and were forced to acquire practical
training through the hard medium of battlefield experience.

The reason

for the absence of an elaborate training scheme and its accompanying
manuals was financial, in that the national pre-war budget for the
military services had alloted only limited funds for an artillery/
mor-car training program in favor of equipment purchases.

Maj or

Langlois I s translated range tables, plus his unpublished notes from
the classes he had conducted at the Colegio Militar, constituted the
entire range of printed instruction material available, and were
reprinted extensively for staff and offic�r consumption, but no
formalized artillery or mortar manuals were compiled until 1935
1

Ibid.
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at Marshal; Estigarribia's behest.

This lack of educational

materials curtailed the number of trained effectives for headquarters
personnel, battery staffs, and gun crews, thus making it necessary
to conduct behind-the-line seminars in artillery and mortar operations
during lulls in the fighting.

2

After the •Bolivian failure in 1933 and

national financial mobilization had as sured adequate funds, training
establishments for that specific purpose as well as for all service
branches were established to insure adequate training of recruits
before their dispatch to front-line batteries and mortar platoons.

3

In one sense, Paraguayan training problems in this respect resembled
those faced by the United States in the course of Federal mobilization
in 1940-1941: a plethora of manpower, but an absence of vital equipment and trained personnel for instructional purposes.
The structure of command used by the Paraguayan General
Staff to integrate artillery and mortar units into co-ordinated efforts
with other arms was essentially the traditional model advocated by
Kundt.

It was inspired by the French system laid down by the Coulet

Mission, and supported by the military training of Estigarribia, who
was a graduate of the French Ecol{ Militaire and a veteran of the
l
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Western Front trench fighting in 1916-1917.

1

A hierarchial

11

chain 11

of command was ·established between corps commanders down through
subordinate units to the specific unit o!'£icers, but with certain changes
not apparent in the Kundt system.

Ultimate tactical responsibility

still was vested in the corps or division chiefs, but tactical control
coulcl be assumed by a lower echelon officer provided the existing
situation warranted him doing so.

For example, if a regimental

commander desired heavy artillery concentrations from divisional
artillery, he could request them directly without going through
channels to the divisional or corps commander.

2

In this fashion

precious time was saved in field situations where immediate action
was necessary, and the burden of'responsibility was equally distributed among subordinate officers and in some ca5231non-con1missioned
officers, where it rightfully belonged.

3

Although this systematic

alteration tended to oversimplify the chain of command and frequently
tempted front-line officers to assert their authority unnecessarily,
it prevented the Paraguayan field forces from being bound to a
rigid command system lacking an adequate communications net,
1
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and made it possible to use artillery and mortars at the right place
and right moment.

Pre-war maneuvers and practical field experience was limited
by the lack of sufficient funds, as mentioned earlier.

What little

mortar and artillery field training took place was confined to dummy
firing drills and occasional field problems, some of them on the
fringes of the Paraguayan Chaco and away from the sensitive frontier
zone.

1

The main obstacle encountered was the obsolete nature of

the equipment being used and the lack of adequate practice ammunition,
either blank or live rounds.

Newly-acquired weapons and am..,.--nunition

/
were immediately stored in the military arsenals in Asuncion, Villa
Hayes, and Concepci�n, and were not issued to combat units until
the frontier crisis became critical in 1931.

2

Thus, battery and

section practice was dependent upon old, outworn fieldpieces dating
back to the War of The Triple Alliance and fit only for scrap.
Plagued with these inadequate guns, Paraguayan artillerymen wrung
their hands in anguish, and strove to do their best without tele;,copic
sights, and with faulty breech mechanisms, pitted barrels, and oldfashioned instantaneous fuses.

The training report of the regimental

artillery company of the 4th Infantry regiment stated in 1928 that
1
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the aged fuses of the model 1889 Vickers-Armstrong 75 mm
howitzers with which the company was equipped had to be loosened
before firing with mallets and wrenches, and frequently failed to
bur st upon impact because of pitted fuse points. 1 Practice ammunition reserves were almost non-existant, making
order of the day.

2

11

dry-run 11 the

Though beset by mechanical deficiencies in

training material and lacking instructional materials, th e Paraguayan mortar and artillery units possessed a high esprit because
of a competent, toughened core of officers and NC0 1 s, graduates
of the classes taught by Langlois and other French instructors,
and the inherent technical bent plus diligence of the Guarani
artillerymen and mortar crews when given wise leadership and
an opportunity to learn the tools of their trade.
Developmental Schemes
To secure the necessary arms and equipment for strengthening their respective military establishments, Bolivia and Paraguay
each evolved a systematic program based on foreign purchases ,and
programmed to run for a definite period of time.

The Bolivian

plan consisted of a four-year munitions contract signed in 192 7
with Vickers-Armstrong Ltd. of Great �ritain, worth over three
1
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hundred Bolivianos or five hundred thousand dollars by the 192 7
rate of exchange.

1

Contracts were signed with other munitions

firms for the supply of small arms, ammunition, automatic
weapons, and aviation materials, but the bulk of Bolivian fieldpieces and supporting equipme:;1t were derived from Vickers.
Arms purchase planning on the part of the Paraguayan
General Staff began at an earlier date, before friction between
the two powers had reached the danger point.

The military re-

organization scheme of 1924, called the Schevoni Plan after its
author, Colonel Augusto Schevoni then Chief of the General Staff,
proposed the formation of four new infantry regiments with attached
supporting arms to be eventually formed into two new divisions.

2

Tc meet the equipment needs of these new formations, a seven-year
program of gradual equipment purchases from European contractors
was suggested, with no single firm predominating.

Two companies

stood out, however, in the delivery of fieldpieces, ammunition,
communications equipment for artillery and mortar spotting, a,nd
allied gear.

These we:;e Vickers-Armstrong and the Schneider-

Creus ot works of France,

3

long-time rivals in the internatio nal

l

William T. Stone, "International Traffic In Arms and
Ammunition, 11 Foreign Policy Reports, IX (August 16, 1933),
131-32.
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munitions trade, but acting in accord in this instance to supply
the Paraguayan armed forces.
for strange bedfellows.

EconoP-J.ics, in this case, did make

Paraguayan purchases during this seven-

year period were not exclusively confined to the aforementioned
firms, but the greater quantity of the modern field artillery and
ammunition used in the Chaco was derived from Franco-British
factories, thus bringing an aspect of international economic conflict
onto a far-removed battlefield.
Artillery And Mortar Unit Organization
The basic structure for the artillery units of both bel
ligerents was the three-battalion regiment with headquarters battery
and signal detail, totaling in nmnbers of personnel one hundred
officers and enlisted men per regiment in the Paraguayan tables
of organization, and one hundred seventy-five in the Bolivian tables.
It must be remembered that in European terms these would be
considered understrength regiments, but we are dealing here with
infinitely smaller armies and limited manpower resources.

In

both cases, standard Bolivian and Paraguayan infantry divisions had
one artillery regiment attached, out of which separate batteries
could be told off for specific missions, as we shall illustrate in
Chapter IV.
1

All divisional artillery units could be integrated at

Ibid., I, 73-74
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the corps level to form corps artillery, but neither corps organi
zation possessed organic artillery battalions or regiments,

1

as

would be the case for both the Allies and the Axis powers in World
In regimental terms, the formations consisted of one

War II.

battalion of 105 mm fieldpieces, and two battalions of 75 mm
howitzers.

In Bolivian artillery regiments, a battalion consisted of

three batteries of four guns apiece, totaling thirty-six pieces.

2

Paraguayan regiments, on the other hand, made up battalion components of three batte1·ies of two guns apiece, totaling eighteen
pieces.

3

Accordingly, Paraguayan regiments possessed fewer

cannon than their Bolivian opposites, and sacrificed gunpower for
the sake of mobility, due to lack of material resources.

Further-

more, Paraguayan and Bolivian infantry regiments each had an
organic artillery company, generally consisting of four pieces for
direct support purposes, utilizing specially-made infantry howitzers
or obsolete fieldpieces such as the model 1898 Krupp 75 mm used
4
by p
• araguay.

The mortar, being a relatively new weapon to both bellig1
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erents, was integrated into their respective tables of organization
differently in each case.

Each Bolivian regiment of infantry included

in its components a twelve-tube mortar platoon consisting of two
officers and up to twenty enlisted men to provide support at the
regimental level in co-operation with the regimental gun company.

1

The platoon could also be broken up into two-tube sections (under
the command of an NCO) to support line battalions or companies,
with fire to be controlled in both cases by field telephone.

Para-

guayan regiments, although possessing an organic cannon company,
had no such counterpart unit in their tables of organization for
mortar units.

Lacking sufficient numbers of these weapons to

constitute such·organic components, Paraguayan mortar crews and
their tubes were parceled out to line regiments in two to three-tube
sections.

Crew numbers were small (only 4 or 5 men to a tube),

and command responsibility was more often than not vested in an
experienced non-commissioned officer who took his orders directly
from regimental headquarters.

2

Out of necessity, mortars in this

particular instance would not be formed into formal platoons, because such concentrations would inevitably leave some regiments
without any mortars at all.

As the front shifted northward, and

Bolivian mortars and ammunition fell into Paraguayan hands, scratch
1
2
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mortar platoons were built from the ground up, but no pre-war unit
of this nature existed in the General Staff T / 0.

A word must be said here concerning the apportionment of
artillery and mortars in relation to troop strength. Because of
obvious material superiority, Bolivian apportionment of these heavy
weapons was extremely high in relation to the relative size of the
respective combat units, though not as high as in comparable
European or United States formations. In Paraguayan regiments,
however, fieldpieces and mortars were stretched thin to assure
that each unit received a proportionate share. In terms of a conflict
of the nature of Korea or South Vietnam, such elasticity would be
considered suicidal. For example, artillery pieces were allotted
on the basis of one to every four hundred eighty men in an infantry
regiment, and mortars one to every seven hundred men.

Cavalry

regiments averaged one fieldpiece to every two hundred men, and
one mortar to every two squadrons.

1

Material shortages forced

Estigarriqa and his staff to adopt this dangerous expedient dur_ing
the first twelve months of the war, until additional purchases could
bring the artillery and mortar units up to normal complement
equipment-wise.

1
2

/

2

Though tactically a c;alculated risk, the General

Gonzalez, op. cit., II, 40.
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banked on the bushfighting ability of his soldiers and the bewilder
ment of his opponents by the irregularity and harshness of the
terrain to balance these deficiences, and won his gamble by a narrow
margin.
Logistical Aspects
To keep a modernized military ground force in ope ration for
sustained periods of time, the development of accessible elastic
lines of supply is an absolute prerequisite for success in warfare.
Not only must the front-line infantryman be fed, clothed, and
supplied with ammunition, medical care, and other necessities, but
his supporting arms must be given the same degree of attention lest
they become inefficient in backing him up.

This maxim is especially

true concerning field artillery and mortar units, whose logistical
needs are exceptionally heavy in the areas of ammunition, and field
transport.

In the Chaco, the maintenance of general supply links

for both armies was sufficient to challenge the patience and ingenuity
of any logistical organization.

For the artillery and mortar units,

it became a contest of endurance, and an unending war against the
pervasive bush.
Ammunition became the foremo�t logistical requirement of
the Bolivian and Paraguayan artillery and mortar units, as it never
seemed to exist in sufficient quantities to assure sustained fire in
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support of the troops in the trenches.

Both belligerents had ample

reserve ammunition dumps, but these were located at extreme distances from the front, and could be reached only by torturous, heavilyrutted roads which, in most cases, were merely trails cut out of
the scrub, and were consistently choked with two-way traffic.

Stock-

piling of shells, powder bags, and other vital equipment at locations
close to the front was out of the question so long as the respective
quartermaster and ordnance units lacked vehicular transport.

Most

ammunition and related supplies was moved to the battery sites by
mule-driven carts or pack animals, which were more adapted to the
climatic conditions, but whose movement under poor weather conditions
or heat was equal to the proverbial snail's pace. As a result, batteries were kept out of action on both sides at critical junctures by
ammunition shortages, or were forced to curtail support fires by
rationing the number of shells used.

1

Battery dispersal in the brush and thick scrub made for other
problems as well, forcing supply train personnel to muscle the, heavy
shells by hand through the thickets to the battery sites, which was a
time-consuming and exhausting process for men who might have to
march thirty miles or more to deliver t4e goods.

Ortiz relates

that on numerous occasions at Alihuata in November, 1932, several

1 V1daurre,
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batteries of Bolivian artillery with excellent firing positions were
forced to displace closer to the Arce road to obtain more ammunition,
and not by virtue of Paraguayan counter-fires.

1

Heavy-duty trucks

with light chassis and independent suspension systems to navigate
the Chaco roads were the apparent solution to supply problems in
general, and those of the heavy weapons units in particular.

Neither

army, however, had such vehicles in quantity, nor the funds to
obtain them, or the means of maintenance for them.

Most of the

vehicles used by the Paraguayan or Bolivian quartermaster companies
were comandeered civilian trucks, buses, or jitneys completely unfit
for service over third-class roads.

In

addition, the transportation units possessing such vehicles

were so few in actual number that delivery of rations, water, small
arms ammunition, and other items was given top priority over the
logistical requirements of artillery and mortar units, who were
considered fit to fend for themselves.

Playing second fiddle to the

infantry was far from pleasant for the gunners of both armies, although
it is admissable that the needs of the respective infantry units
(especially in terms of water and ammunition) were more pressing.
For example, Paraguay had one thousa�d vehicles of all types and
running conditions, but the General Staff saw fit only to allot five
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trucks per artillery regiment to be used as ammunition and ration
carriers,and not as prime movers.

l

It would be simple to lay charges

of parsimony or ignorance against the planners responsible for such
a decision, but these charges are unsubstantiated in view of the
primacy: attached to artillery and mortar units by the General Staff.
The concensus of opinion was that vehicular transport was vital for
logistical support of the infantry first, and all other arms in their
proper turn.

Bolivia's ·vehicular reserve was equally large, but was

utilized in a like manner to the disadvantage of the heavy weapons units.
Both armed services faced even more critical problems in
the area of weapons maintenance. Again, the problem was not a
decided shortage of spare parts and trained artificers, but how to get
them up to the front where they could do the most good. If a fieldpiece, for example, suffered a jammed breechblock, immobilization
was the end result, unless available spares and ordnance personnel
happened to be handy. It was impossible to maintain ordnance
companies in the field per se, as their technical skills were needed
behind the lines at rear-area supply dumps and government arsenals
2
/
at Asuncion and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Consequently, the average

Paraguayan or Bolivian artillerist or rnortarman became his own
1

,,
Gonzalez, op. cit., I, 267.
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armorer, so to speak, and fell back upon improvisation to provide
what field ordnance could not do.

His task was complicated by the

incessant heat, torrential rains in the fall which rusted elevating
wheels, pitted barrels, and ruined optical sights, clouds of dust
during the dry season which wore ·down breech linings by sand abrasion,
and the attendant health hazards derivative from a hostile climate.
There were no rear areas in the Gran Chaco 1 and the men of the
artillery and mortar units suffered in equal proportion with their
fellows in the trenches on both sides of the firing line.
Without trucks or equivalent vehicles as prime movers,
field artillery and mortars moved by mule team, horses, or upon
occasion, by shank's mare if the road was too narrow or muddy.
Mortars were usually transported by hand in the line of march, but
artillery was another matter entirely.

Unless rapid cross-country

movement was part of the tactical conditions called for, artillery
regiments moved up or back from the front on the main roads, with
six-mul.e hitches drawing the caissoned fieldpieces.

Both bellig-

erents made extensive use of draft animals for this purpose, in
which Paraguayan a!tillerymen had a decided edge derived from
1
In several instances, however,
their cattle-ranching experience.
draft mules, horses, or oxen were liabilities rather than assets in
1

Ibid.
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rapid transit of artillery.

Skittishness under fire and the high

costs of procuring animal forage, plus the necessity for veterinary
services, could prevent a regiment from going into action just as
surely as a lack of ammunition.

Nevertheless, the majority of

artillery units in both armies retained draft animals as prime
movers to the conclusion of the war in 1935.

1

Trucks or other

vehicles were rarely used to draw artillery pieces, except in cases
of

u npla nned.:vi.thdrawal where speed was of the essence in re-

moving valuable equipment.

Once off the main arteries of communication, artillery units
were severely handicapped in their radius of movement.

It is one

thing to haul a fieldpiece with a team along an existing road, but
quite another to move it cross-country through acacia and sawgrass.
However, both parties attempted cross-country marches at various
stages of the campaign with heavy weapons, with varying degrees
of success.

These efforts in their tactical perspective will be

discussed in turn in Chapter IV.

The Paraguayan forces, having

an intimate knowledge of the terrain, took the lead in the use of
11 Backpacking

11

artillery in the Chaco bush; a factor which undoubtedly

contributed to the high degree of mobili�y exercised by Paraguayan
troops in pursuit and encirclement situations.
1

Ibid.

Such mobility allowed
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Paraguayan artillery units to move in step with advancing infantry
columns and deliver needed fire support, and permitted quick withdrawal overland should the unit be surrounded as was the case at
Picu:fr:.a in October.., 1934.

l

The fieldpieces and mortars used by

both armies lent the ms elves readily to such tactics, being primarily
intended for mountain warfare, and easily dismantled, packed in to
a battery site piece by piece on muleback, re-assembled, and
readied for firing in a matter of hours.

While fought in climate

alien to orthodox pack artillery tactics, the use of knocked-down
artillery and mortars by the belligerents is reminiscent of the "flying batteries" of the Civil War in their source of locomotion -- the strong, uncomplaining backs of horses, mules, and sometimes
men.
Methods Of Obseryation And Fire Control

The difficulties encountered in positioning a fieldpiece or
mortar, operating it effectively, and keeping it supplied with
adequate ammunition and spare parts are compounded if the means
of fire control prove to .be ineffective, or the terrain hampers
efficient observation of worthwhile targets.

In

bush fighting, such

as in the Chaco, accuracy of support fir.es becomes a critical issue,
and the army with the most efficient observation system possesses

1

David H. Zook, The Conduct of The Chaco War (New York:
Bookman Associates, l 96iT,° pp. 205-206-.-
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a definite edge in this department, tactically speaking.

While both

belligerents utilized methods of fire control that were particularly
advantageous to their material circumstances, neither obtained a
clear-cut superi"ority over the other, except in certain areas of
specialization which will be considered in due course.

The very

ruggedness of the Chaco landscape limited the ground-level observation of artillery and mortar spotters, causing both sides to completely miss troop concentrations, gun emplacements, and the like
which were masked·by the impenetrable brush and second-growth
timber in the Chaco Central.
'

As a result, if fires were not carefully

adjusted, one I s shells might be landing in friendly trenches instead
of hitting the opponent's positions.

This, in part, was due to the

interlocking nature of the ground fighting, where Paraguayan and
Bolivian trenches often lay less than fifty feet apart, and mortars
had to be raised to the full length of the elevation screw to be fired
effectively.

l

As a consequence of the confusing nature of the terrain,
delivery of fire concentrations using open sights became the most
effective method of obser vation, albeit the most hazardous for gun
crew and observer alike because of vulne rability to return fire.

We

have previously referred to the adoption of open-sight gunnery by the
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Paraguayan heavy weapons establishment as standard doctrine; a
method which obviously benefits gun crews in ranging in upon
stationary targets, such as a machine-gun nest.

However, if the

target is mobile, tracking and spotting fire to destroy same is
difficult since it is impossible to aim a heavy fieldpiece as one would
a rifle.

In order to deal with this problem, and the handicaps imposed

by vegetation, .the Chaco belligerents developed a variety of methods
for spotting and controlling artillery and mortar fire.

Securing a vantage point above the ground became the first
essential to effective fire control in the Chaco, and so both armies
naturally turned to the forest to provide perches for observation.
The bulk of the existing timber was second-growth, but in some
sections of the region, especially those close to the major rivers,
virgin timber still towered above the surrounding scrub in small
groves of quebracho, ceiba, tropical cedar, and other such varieties
of the Latin American rain forest which grew in the river valleys.
In the largest of these, crude platforms made. of branches and logs
carefully lashed w ith liana vines were erected in the highest solid
limbs, and used as tree-top observation posts.

Easily commanding

a view of the surrounding countryside, t.hey were generally manned
by two or three signalers equipped with a rangefinder or fieldglasses,
. maps, and a field telephone or signal flags to communicate with their
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parent batteries or regiments.

1

They were used by both Bolivian

and Par_aguayan observation teams, although the latter possessed
immediate advantages in knowledge of the terrain and in concealing
their position through artful camouflage to such an extent that they
could operate behind enemy lines without hinderance.

An example

of such a feat came in March of 1933, when a fire-control team
from the 2nd Artillery Regiment of the Paraguayan 2nd Division
remained behind Bolivian lines near Arce for a week, directing
artillery fire by a concealed telephone line upon the Bolivian-held
portion of the Arce-Alihuata road until they were discovered and
2
driven out of their tree-top nest by Bolivian patrols ..

These tree

platforms came into extensive use early in the conflict, when fight
/
ing was centered around Arce-Alihuata-Campo Via in the Southeastern Chaco,

3

although their employment was general throughout

the war wherever suitable trees large enough to support a man could
be found.

On occasion, bloody patrol actions would occur as both

sides skirmished to gain possession of a tree platform commanding
a wide vista of the surrounding bush.

Harking back to the old

Teutonic system of tree sentinels, these platforms, .crude and illequipped as they were, were the prime observational stations throughout the Chaco campaigns.
1

Vidaurre, op. cit. , p. 244.

2
Ibid.
3

Ibid., p. 245.
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In the front lines, where tree platforms made inviting targets
for automatic weapons and sniper fire, the forward observer team
assumed the burdens of fire control and observation.

Anywhere

from two to four artillery observers (either artillery personnel or
infantry volunteers) commanded by an artillery ·officer or NCO
trained in observational methods would be integrated into the respective battalion headquarters to call down preparatory or defensive
fires, and to assist in spotting fire for regimental guns.

1

As in the

case of tree platforms, both artillery and mortar organizations used
such teams.

However, the superiority of Balivian communications

equipment and the predominance of the new battery-powered radiotelephone possessed by Bolivian signal companies gave an initial
advantage to the Bali vian FOT I s, in that constant communication
could be maintained with parent batteries or mortar platoons without
the attendant hazards of wiretapping or wire cutting by infiltrators
2
.
or enemy shellfire.

The Paraguayan signal establishment possessed

few of these new signal devices forcing Paraguayan observation teams
to rely upon old-style crank wirephones of French make, and, upon
occasion, semaphore flags to direct supporting fire�.

3

Thus, communi-

cations efficiency was often impaired by mechanical breakdowns or
1
,.
Ib·d
l • i pp, 24 6 •4 7,
-2
3

!.

Ibid.
.
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severing of the phone wires by shellfire, leading to a loss of
at critical junctures.

11 control

11

Paraguayan signalers soon learned to bury their

precious wires to avoid nuch happenings, and used another ancient
method, the heliograph, to communicate with rear-area batteries
when the weather permitted.

1

In any case, forward observation

teams in both armies, despite an equipment disparity, performed
well under the adverse conditions of trench warfare, and suffered
corresponding heavy casulties.

An observer's morale was hardly

improved when his aerial .or phone line. was made the object of a
sustained mortar barrage, or when he was chosen as the object of
attention by sharpshooters in the trenches opposite.

Is it any wonder

that under these circumstances, sustained accuracy from forward
observers was, at best, inconsistent?

Aerial observation of gunfire might have proven to be the
ultimate solution to the fire control problems of both belligerents,
were it not for the absence of an effective air arm on the pa rt of one
of them.

Paraguay's aerial potential had been neglected in favor

of ground-unit development, whereas Bolivia possessed at the
commencement of hostilities a small but well-trained air force with
several multi-purpose squadrons verse.cl in observation and fire
control.

We must consider, though, that such a disparity was
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balanced by the fact that aerial observation and close-support in
the Chaco were sometimes accurate and sometimes not by virtue
of the omnipresent variable of the terrain.

To a pilot 1 s eye, the

expanse of the Chaco appears as a slightly undulating brownish-

"'

green blanket, broken only by canadas, scattered patches of forest,
and a few man-made clearings or roads.

Prominent landmarks

are difficult to distinguish from the air, and low-level observation
1
useless in view of the density of the ground vegetation. As a result,
fliers of both armies were often confused by the uniformity of the
landscape, and often erred in their selection of targets.

Extensive

training is necessary for accurate interpretation and direction of
artillery fire by aerial observation, and this the Paraguayan Army 1 s
Aviation Corps did not have.

At the outbreak of the war, only five

Potez 25 reconnaissance bombers, purchased from Avian Marneet-Seine Ltd. in 1924, were available for service with trained
crews.

On the twenty-first of September, 1933, the last of these

was shot dgwn by Bolivian Focke-Wulf 310 1 s over Algondon, depriv
ing Paraguayan artillery regiments of effective air-spot throughout
the .remainder of the conflict.

2

Paraguayan fighter pilots, untrained

in observational techniques, attempted to fill their places with
improvised spotting methods, but with few notable successes.

1
2

,,,

Gonzalez, op. cit. , I, 203-204.
Ibid.
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Bolivia, on the other hand, had developed a highly-trained
three-squadron reconnaissance group, trained by German and
American contract pilots at the National Aviation School in La Paz,
which could double in brass as a close-support group.

1

Primarily,

it was equipped with either the Focke-Wulf 310, a single-seat, allmetal biplane fighter manufactured in Germany by Fo eke-Wulf Ltd.
of Bremen, or the Curtiss Falcon, a two-seat metal biplane designed
by Curtiss-Wright Inc. of Buffalo, New York as a reconnaissance
bomber.

2

The aforementioned squadrons, together with other

elements of the Bolivian Air Force, operated from landing fields
/
at Vanguardia, Balli,ian, and Villa Montes, plus smaller auxiliary
dirt strips closer to the front lines, weather conditions pending.
While under administrative command of the Air Force, their tactical
duties were dictated by the Army commander in the Chaco in
accordance with the chain-of-command advocated by Kundt.

3

In

response to a request for aerial observation forwarded by a frontline commander, a· two-to-three plane element would arrive on the
scene, locate the tar get by low-level observation,. and direct regimental, divisional, or corps fires upon it.

Since two-way radio

communication with ground units was impossible due to a lack of
1
Vidaurre, op. cit., pp. 247-49.
2

Ibid.

55
effective transmitters, a variety of methods were used, including
the tried-and-true streamer drop used m World War I, the dropping
of smoke bombs, combinations of Very flares and tracers fired
over enemy positions, and dummy strafing runs.

Aerial photo-

graphy, which might have revealed camouflaged positions to both
sides, was completely neglected because of a lack of aerial camera
equipment and specialized training by both air establishments.

1

Having considered the doctrinal background of artillery
and mortar usage in the Chaco and the influences of training,
developmental planning, administration, logistics, and observational
method, we must now turn to the main characters, the weapons
themselves, and consider their technical attributes in relation to
the conflict and its outcome.

1

Ibid.

Ill.

THE WEAPONS AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT

Mortars
The ideal infantry close-support weapon for brush fighting
such as that experienced by Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco proved
to be the trench mortar; one of the innovations in ordnance material
developed during World War I.

Inexpensive to manufacture, the

mortar is capable of a high rate of sustained, rapid fire, even with
inexperienced crews, and can be easily moved from position to
position without any sacrifice of mobility, while field pieces or
infantry cannon cannot be handled without difficulty.

Furthe rmore,

it can be effectively operated by the front-line soldier without prior
instruction or formalized crews if need be, and can deliver a wide
variety of shells besides high explosive and fragmentation, among
them illumination, smoke, and chemical projectiles.

In the see-

saw defensive conflict that was the Chaco War, both belligerents
made extensive use of mortars as basic weapons for close support,
and, in some instances, a mortar section or platoon constituted the
only available support unit for many line battalions or regiments.
The tubes in question were both foreign in manufacture, although
an improvised substitute was utilized by Paraguay at a later date,
and will be considered in due course.
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Initially, the Stokes -Brandt trench mortar had been designed
as a device for breaching barbed-wire entanglements, and only in
the latter stages of World War I had it been used for high-angle fire
against entrenchments, machine-gun nests, and like targets.

Develop-

ed by Browning Arms Ltd. of Belgium and named for two British
Army officers who originated the design, the Stokes-Brandt was an
81 mm. (three inch) tube made of rust-proof chrome steel, with a
.
l
light-weight supporting tripod and a reinforced baseplate.
Possessing a high degree of elevation (better than 45 degrees vertical with
the elevating screw at full), it had an effective range of over two
thousand yards, and could deliver an estimated forty-five to fifty
rounds per minute when handled by an expert crew.

2

To the un-

skilled Guarani infantry, it was as good as an artille ry piece, and
accordingly took the place of artillery on several occasions where
the terrain did not favor the use of fieldpieces, or in cross-country
attacks where the batteries could not follow without a road being cut.
The accuracy attained by Paraguayan mortar crews, despite the
lack of aiming stakes and range tables, increased as the war moved
further north, mainly because of the high-angle simplicity of the
Stokes-Brandt itself and the hand-to-hand nature of the ground
fighting.

1
2

The Bolivian General Staff, on the othe r hand, had purIbid. , pp. 146-4 7.

Enrique Vidaurre, El Material De Guerra En La Campana
Del Chaco, pp. 146-4 7,
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chased a number of Stokes-Brandts prior to the outbreak of the war
for experimental purposes, but made limited use of them in a combat
role.

This was primarily due to Kundt 1 s insistence upon a heavier

tube in weight and caliber, similar to the German minethrowers of
1914-1918.

As a result of this decision, the Bolivian Stokes-Brandts

went into battle with well-trained crews, but were consigned tactically
to a military Limbo.
The mortar selected to supplant the Stokes-Brandt in the
Bolivian Army was American in manufacture, and a literal giant in
size and caliber.

It had been developed by the American Armament

Corporation of White Plains, New York for the export market, and
the entire initial consignment, nearly one hundred tubes in all, was
.
l
purchased by Bolivia in 1931.
The AAC was equivalent in caliber
to the m.odern 105 mm. howitzer in present use by the United States
Army, and packed tremendous firing 11 punch 11 for a relatively lightweight weapon.

Considering the caliber of shell fired, one might

expect the AAC to be lacking in portability, but such was not the
case.

The designers at White Plains had copied the Stokes-Brandt

tripod and suspension systems, and had attached them to the AAC,
with a sturdier base plate to compensate for the heavy recoil.
1Ibid.PP:159-62.

--,··

2
Ibid.

2

Its
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rate of fire was equally as rapid as that of the Stokes-Brandt, and
the approximate range of the shell was increased to almost twentyfive hundred yards by the use of super-charged Cortex shells.

1

In

overaHperformance, it frequently bested the Stockes-Brandt on the
battlefield, but fell down in the matter of ease of operation.

The

attached range table_s and elevating mechanisms of the AAC were
excessively complicated, and could not be interpreted by illiterate
Indians who could not read the English-Spanish dual markings.

Con-

sequently, Bolivian mortar crews spent valuable time puzzling over
indecipherable instructions, while their Paraguayan counterparts,
free of such encumberances, fired their tubes by rule of thumb and
eyesight and more often than not hit their tar g-ets.
Mention should be made here of an ingenious mechanical
improvisation concocted by the Paraguayan ordnance personnel at
I

the National Arsenal in Asuncion to supplement the Stokes-Brandt
81 's.

To compensate for the fact that mortars were

1 1 spread

thin 11

throughout the Paraguayan ranks because of numerical deficiencies,
the ordnance crews, after lengthy experimentation and testing, devised and produced from seventy-five to one hundred
as substitutes.

1

1

mortarettes 11

These were primitive w.eapons with two-and-one

half inch barrels mounted on a wooden base, which fired simple iron
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shells of approximately 60 mm. , loaded with black powder.
effective range was a little less than one hundred fifty yards,

Their
1

making

them something less than an accurate infantry support weapon. However, as scare devices, they were unparalleled, as they simulated
the discharge of 75 mm fieldpieces, and their shells reproduced the
sound of a

11

75 11 in flight.

Many a Bolivian infantry unit received a

severe case of battlefield jitters from these weapons, and some
prematurely abandoned prepared positions in the war's early stages
upon the firing of a few "mortarettes 11 •

In comparison with modern

weapons, they faintly resembled the old grenade discharger used
by the Japanese Imperial Army in the Pacific, at least in terms
of overall accuracy of fire.
Infantry Cannon
We have previously mentioned in Chapter II that direct
support of infantry in both armies was not limited to their respective
mortar establishments.

2

At the regimental level, Balivian and

Paraguayan infantry units possessed organic artillery units made
up of light artillery designed to handle firing missions beyond the
scope of mortar support, but not requiring the full weight of
divisional or corps artillery. The primary role, in both cases, of
1
2

Ibid., pp. 165-67.
Supra-- 1 p. 38.
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infantry cannon came to be delivery of support fires in co-ordination
with frontal attacks by the infantry upon fortified positions, defensive
concentrations to repel similar attacks, and mass concentration of
fires in co-operation with divisional and corps artillery units.

These

missions, in all circumstances, required fieldpieces which could
conveniently be served by a small crew and which could advance
along with the infantry over broken ground, giving supporting fire
as they were moved.

In this re13pect, Bolivian cannon companies

rightfully outdid similar Paraguayan organizations, but only by virtue
of mate rial superiority.

Both belligerents used their regimental

gun components consistently in action, and used them with skill
and flexibility.
Bolivian regiments generally utilized a British-made product
as the backstop of their cannon companies; namely, the VickersArmstrong 65 mm. infantry howitzer, model 1926.

Resembling in

outward appearance a child 1 s toy cannon, it was nevertheless a super
lative infantry-support weapon, and one hundred ninety of them were
employed by Bolivian line regiments during the war for this purpose.

1

It hugged the ground with a low silhouette, forcing its four-man crew
to operate from a crouching position, ht�t had the advantages of a
semi-hydraulic breechblock, hard steel wheels with rubber oversoles
1

Ibid. , pp. 1 7 2- 74
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for ease of movement in rough terrain, and attached telescopic sights
for direct fire.

1

Originally designed as a mountain artillery piece,

the Vickers 65 could be rapidly dismantled for overland movement, or
transported complete (minus wheels) on muleback.

A light steel

trail with attached handles permitted the crew to easily push the piece
over rough ground, or even lift it bodily should the need arise. Its
2
range was better than two thousand yards, making it useful for the
application of indirect, ·spotted fire if the situation warranted such
measures. Operating in a four-gun section, the Vickers 65 could
readily advance in pace with attacking infantry, laying fire on specific
targets or a general blanketing fire, reminiscent of the tactics used
by German infantry cannon companies in Poland, The Low Countries,
and France in 1939-1940. The success of such tactics in the Chaco
/
was demonstrated during the siege of Paraguayan-held Fortin Toledo
(February 2nd- -March 15th, 1933), where the cannon companies of
the assaulting Bolivian 4th and 7th divisions effectively silenced the
I'

fire of Paraguayan machine guns and automatic weapons in the for tin I s
outer trench line,

3

main fortifications.
1
2
3

and opened gaps in the wire obstacles before the
However, this manuever was relatively inef-

Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 174-75.
Ibid.
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fective due to the inadequate crew protection offered by the thin
splinter shield from shrapne 1 and small arms fire, and similar use
of the Vickers 65 at Nanawa resulted in heavy crew casulties as the
alerted Paraguayan infantry concentrated well-aimed mortar and
autor.natic fire on the unprotected guns and disabled them.

1

Although

the Vickers infantry howitzer was unquestionably effective in its
support role, the consistent repetition of the same set of tactics
again and again by the Bolivian regimental and divisional commanders,
on the basis of one success, soon negated its value and permitted
the Paraguayans to create a defense against it.
Paraguayan infantry regiments were less fortunate in the
fieldpieces selected to comprise their regimental artillery establishments. · Instead of drawing modern infantry howitzers, as their
Bolivian counterparts did, the regimental cannon companies in the
Paraguayan Army received pieces that had plagued pre-war training
exercises by their mechanical breakdowns and chronological age;
namely, old-fashioned Krupp 75 m...""ll. mountain howitzers of 1898
2
.
v1_ntage.
These high-silhouetted, heavy cannon had lain untouched
in arsenals and depots since the turn o"f the century, and were now
distributed as infantry support weapons. because of both the lack of
1
2

Ibid.

.Thi.£. ,

p. l 78
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effective light artillery and of the funC:s for its purchase.

Time

and tropical climate had taken their toll, even with careful storage
in cosmoline, resulting in a multitude of maintenance and recondition
/
ing problems for the overworked arsenal staff at Asuncion and the
gun crews in the field.

When not disabled by faulty components or

defective ammunition, the ancient Krupps could deliver a high rate
of fire due·· to a completely hydraulic breech-block, and naturally
fired a heavier shell than the Bolivian Vickers 65 mm.

1

Due to

size and unwieldliness, their ability to be moved along with advancing infantry was limited, especially over broken ground, but in a
stationary position, these old German howitzers could be devastating,
as will be seen presently.

By 1931, the Paraguayan Ordnance Bureau had signed a
contract with a Swiss branch· of Browning Ltd. for the manufacture
of a new, ultra-light fieldpiece to compliment the outmoded Krupp
75 1 s.

These pieces, called

Semaks

after the corporate name of the

subsidy, were actually light machine-cannon, 28/20 mm. in caliber,
designed as multi-purpose guns to be used by infantry.

2

In detail,

the Semak was much smaller in wheelbase and total weight than the
Vickers howitzer, fired a 2-1/2 pound .shell via a six-shell clip
1
2

Ibid.
Ibid.
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mounted atop the breech, had steel wheels with rubber treads and a
light steel trail, and possessed an effective range of less than twelve
hundred yards.

1

In addition, elevating wedges could be inserted

under the breech and carriage to convert it to an anti-aircraft gun,
although the long trail and lack of telescopic sights hindered it in
this capacity.

2

A large consignment of Semaks were prepared for

delivery, but only fifteen to twenty of these reached Paraguay in time
for the commencement of hostilities, serving with the 1st and 2nd
Infantry Divisions at Arce, Toledo, and Nanawa.

3

Had the entire

shipment arrived, Paraguayan regimental gunners might have been
able to compete on equal terms with their well-armed Bolivian
counterparts.

In spite of its ease of operation and the fact that it

could be moved and fired by a two-rnan crew, the Semak did not
possess sufficient muzzle velocity or a heavy enough shell to destroy
a fortified pillbox, unless the shells pierced the firing slits.

4

Against

uncovered targets, however, its performance was comparable to a
similar weapon, the French-made Hotchkiss 25 mm. gun, as an
anti-personnel vehicle or in destroying lightly-armored mechanized
equipment.

A consideration of the Semak 1 s value as an anti-tank

piece will be related in the section sub-titled "Special Artillery Types 11•
1

Ibid.
2
Ibid.
3
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Fieldpieces

To be successfully used in bush warfare, such as in the
Chaco, the regular artillery establishments of the two belligerents
had to be built around fieldpieces characterized by lightness of
weight and a high degree of mobility.

Consequently, ultra-heavy

artillery of the conventional pattern, requiring uniformity of terrain
and mechanized prime movers, was generally eschewed in favor of
mountain-type piece·s with the advantages previously referred to.
Considering the contrary nature of the Chaco Boreal terrain as a
whole, and the need for artillery which could move rapidly in pace
with the infantry, the primacy of pack artillery in the conflict might
well be justified.

However, certain technical difficulties in the

re-fitting of these mountain pieces for an entirely new tactical role
arose and limited their total effectiveness in indirect fire support
for both sides th·roughout the war.

Being designed for the rigors of

back-pack warfare in a mountainous region, the lightweight construction
and carriages of the artillery used by the belligerents was often too
fragile to stand the pounding of impassable roads and trails or rough
handling by half-tr�ined crews.

Range· tables and optical sights, in

these cases, had been designed for a di!ferent purpose; namely,
indirect fire support at high altitude, and were basically inaccurate
for lowland, tropical warfare.

When the period of trial-and-error

adjustment necessary for the adoption of new weapons into a strange
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climate had passed, Bolivian and Paraguayan artillerists both
managed to make effective use of their bastard equipment, but only
after prolonged experimentation and countless mistakes in the field.

,

Enrique Gonzalez neatly sums up the problem for both sides in his
cornments on Paraguayan experiences with mountain artillery in a
conventional conflict:
The cannons were thus converted into regular
field artillery under negative conditions, but con
tinued with the range and the same inconveniences
suited to mountain pieces. The fact is that the only
non-mountainous nation in the Americas acquired,
not all at the same time, mountain artillery ... 1 1
11

1

By far the most durable fieldpiece of the mountain type
employed during the conflict was the Schneider-Creusot 75 mm.
howitzer, model 192 7, which was used primarily by Paraguayan
batteries and which became the mainstay of the Paraguayan artillery
regiments.

By its rugged construction and simplicity of operation,

the Schneider 75 gave the Paraguayan ranks a decided material
advantage over their opposite numbers, at least in the area of
field artillery.

While light in total weight and possessing a light-

weight gun carriage, the 192 7

11

75 11 had the additional advantages of

tempered steel parts treated to prevent rusting, an hydraulic-slide
breech, telescopic sights, and range-f�nding equipment with simple
/
mathematical tables printed in Spanish and Guarani ,to allow rapid

,,,
l Gonzalez,
op. cit., I, 2 75.

calculation of firing data by inexperienced personnel.

1
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The cast

aluminum fuses used by the 1927 model's ammunition were also
rustproof, and adaptable to any recent-model 75 mm. shell, thus
making them sought-after prizes by Bolivian gun crews, whose
own cast-iron fuses often failed to detonate upon impact because of
rust.

2

The maximum range of the model 1927, firing indirect with

3
observation, was approximately thirty-four hundred yards, making
it a useful fieldpiece for high-angle as well as flat trajectory fires.
Bolivian artillery regiments possessed a number of Schneider fieldpieces interspersed with their modern equipment, but these were
older, pre-World War models (the 1907 model 75 mm. howitzer,
and the 1911 model 75 mm. pack howitzer) which were inferior to
the model 1927 in construction, silhouette ease of handling, and
condition of ammunition, especially in the matter of rust-proof fuses.
The primary fieldpiece utilized by the Bolivian artillery
regiments was also of recent vintage, and was introduced at the
same time as the Vickers 65 mm. infantry howitzer, resembling it
closely in many aspects.
l
2

3

Titled the model 1926 75 mm. mountain

Vidaurre, op. cit. , pp. 214-15.
Ibid.
Ibid.

4
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howitzer and distributed by Vickers-Armstrong Ltd., its major
advantages lay in its light carriage and rust-proof construction of
stainless steel and nickel. Its deficiencies far outweighed these
factors, when we consider its mechanical breech and pneumatic
recoil system, which markedly slowed down the rate of fire, and
the absence of telescopic sights. Yet, the built-in range table and
trajectory indicator did compensate for the lack of the latter in opensight firing.

1

Again, the. old bugaboo of cast-iron fuses susceptible

to rust cropped up once more, although the Vickers fuses were less
liable to rust and moisture than the older Schneiders, due to a
protective coating of cosmoline applied before storage.

2

In com-

petent hands, the Vickers 75 proved to be an adequate fieldpiece
for close-range bush fighting, but in an artillery-versus-artillery
duel, the advantage always went to the superior Schneider model 1927.

Heavy components in the artillery establishments of the
belligerents were provided by fieldpieces of the classic pattern,
at least in terms of caliber, as two of the pieces were originally
designed as mountain howitzers.

Let us first examine the Schneider-

Creusot 105 mm. howitzer, model 1927, which resembled its "little
brother 75 11 in construction, carriage, recoil mechanism, and fire
1

Ibid.

2
Ibid.
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control system.

It weighed over two thousand pounds, however, in

battery, and had a maximum range of forty-five hundred yards,

1

mak-

ing it the heaviest fieldpiece in the Chaco by virtue of weight and
range.

This enormous size provided an additional handicap in speed

of movement, as the Schneider 105 could only be transported by a
six-mule team, and could not be broken down for cross-country
travel.

As a means of indirect support fire at long range, it was

unexcclled, and a few such pieces are still utilized for training purposes in the Paraguayan Army.

2

The Schneider 1 s Bolivian counterparts were also products
of the omnipresent Vickers-Armstrong combine, originally built as
heavy mountain guns for overseas export, but purchased by the
Bali vian General Staff in 1931 to fill the heavy artillery gap in their
regimental tables of organization.

Divided into models

11 B11

and

11

C 11

by weight differential, the model 1931 V-A 105 mm. howitzers were
identical in structure and fire control equipment to the Vickers 75,
with effective ranges of one thousand twenty-one yards for the
and an increased range in.the
fifty-four yards.

1

3

3

Ibid.

B11 ,

of one thousand, three hundred

As with other Vickers products, portability and

. .-23.
Ibid. ,,)>,p._ .219

2
Ibid.

11 C 11

11
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climate-proofing were the main advantages offered by the model
1931.

Here, for an instant, Paraguayan superiority in field

artillery material took a sudden reversal in the very area of strength
that her general staff had relied upon - - superiority in mobility.
Unquestionably, the Schneider 105 outdid the Vickers

11 B 11

and "C"

in terms of range, but this deficiency was overshadowed by the
lightness of the British-made howitzers and the fact they could be
dismantled for cross-country movement; a technique which was
impossible with the bulky Schneider.
Special Artillery Types
In discoursing upon the weapons used in the Chaco for
infantry support purposes, little or no attention has been devoted
to specialized types of artillery, such as anti-tank or anti-aircraft
guns, as neither Bolivia nor Paraguay found it necessary to employ
them in large quantities.

Armored vehicles were handicapped in

the brush, and exposed to heavy risk in attacks across open ground
without infantry support.

The Bolivian air force, on the other hand,

remained quite active throughout the war, but could ·not indulge in
long-range strategic bombing because of a lack of proper aircraft,
while the Paraguayan aviation components were similarly restricted.
Close-support missions and aerial reconnaissance became the sole
preoccupations of both air arms, and these were limited in value
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because of the terrain and the confused nature of the ground fighting.
Consequently, elaborate anti-tank and anti-aircraft establishments
would have been a financial and personnel drain on the two field
It is hardly accurate, however, to maintain that specialized

armies.

weapons of these types did not exist, or that they did not come into
play at various times during the conflict.

Specialized artillery did

have a definite role in the Chaco theatre, although an inherently
subordinate one.
To offset the possibility of Paraguayan purchase of armored
equipment, the Bolivian General Staff placed an order in 1930 with
Skoda Ltd. of Czechoslovakia for twelve 3 7 mm. anti-tank cannon.

1

The purchase soon proved to be premature as Paraguayan tables of
organization contained no blank spaces for tank units at that time or
in the immediate future, and the guns were used to supplement regimental cannon companies in their assigned tactical missions. Although possessing no armor, the Paraguayan forces had an effective
anti-tank piece in the previously mentioned Swiss-built Semak, which
had its baptism of fire at Nanawa on July 4th, 1933.

Three Semaks,

concealed in the scrub on the fortified dry knoll that made up the
keystone of the Nanawa defense complex, accurately crippled two
Bolivian Renault medium tanks by destroying their front treads and

1

/

Gonzalez, .££• cit., II, 32.
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drivers, leaving them helpless in the face of heavier Paraguayan
artillery fire which destroyed them both.

1

This constituted the only

major battle during the course of the conflict in which anti-tank
pieces were used in repelling an armored attack, and it proved to
be the last time that Bolivia used her armor until the end of
hostilities.

Defense against aerial attack was not a major object of
concern to the Bolivian high command, as it knew full well the weakness of its opponent in this respect.

As insurance against the

possibility of Paraguay acquiring modern aircraft and trained pilots,
an order was placed with Oerkilon Ltd. of Zurich, Switzexland in

1931 for the delivery of fifteen Oerkilon twin-mount 20

mm.

auto-

matic cannon, which were received by the Army Ordnance Sections
2
in 1933. Broken into two seven-gun batteries apiece, these fine
weapons served ·as static air-defense units throughout the conflict
at the Expeditionary Force I s major supply centers of Villa Montes
and Santa Cruz without firing a single round at an enemy aircraftl
At a later date, they were to become the favorite light anti-aircraft
cannon of the Allied and Axis naval and land forces during World
The only effective aerial defenses posses_sed by Paraguayan

War II.

ground writs in the face of bombing and strafing was the enthusiastic,
/
unpracticed hail of machine gun and rifle fire directed by the Guarani

1
2

Vidaurre, op. cit., p. 178

Ibid. p� l 79
,
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infantry, which undoubtedly did wonders for troop morale, but
resulted in the destruction of very few Bolivian aircraft.
aspect of aerial defense, Paraguay held full sway.

In another

On the two major

rivers paralleling the Chaco Boreal, the Paraguayan river navy was
in undisputed control of both water and sky, as no Bolivian surface
craft had been built to challenge this supremacy.

The main units,

two six hundred thirty ton armored river gunboats named the

/
Huimanta and the Paraguay, had been built abroad at the yards of

An saldo Ltd. of Genoa in 1930, and were the most powerful craft on
the rivers in terms of armament.

Besides their main batteries of

two si:x;-inch guns apiece, each carried a heavy anti-aircraft battery
made up of four four-inch dual-purpose guns, two 40 mm. automatic
cannon, and six heavy machine guns.

1

From 1932 onward, these

ships convoyed Paraguayan supply steamers along the river routes,
securing them from aerial attack or surprise assaults by Bolivian
artillery on the shore, and provided anti-aircraft defense for ports
up and down the Paraguay and Pilcomayo.

In November of 1932, for

example, the two gunboats broke up a Bolivian bombing raid on the
docks of Puerto Casado by shooting down two Bolivian Junker 52 1 s

'

and damaging several others.

In December of that same year, when

Bolivian air attacks against the capital seemed imminent, one of
these warships, on a rotating schedule, lay moored at the Naval Pier

1

/

Gonzalez, �- �, II, 9,

75

I

.

at Asuncion to give what limited cover it could to the entire city.

l

Naval considerations may lie outside the scope of the present study,
but the activities of these craft in an air defense role are interesting and pertinent to the discussion.

In 1964, thirty-four years after

they slid down the ways at Genoa, both still ply the rivers as survey
ships.

In another connection, one wonders if their tremendous fire-

power potential was not wasted in the latter stages of the conflict,
when accurate shore bombardment might have broken the Bolivian
grip on Ballivan more quickly, and hastened the pursuit of the re
l
treating Bolivian armies north towards the Parapiti.

It was not the intention of the author to go into great lengths
concerning the technical details of the infantry support weapons used
in the Chaco.

To prevent confusion, and to provide details concerning

ballistics and allied subjects, appendices containing this information·
plus a number of plates visually representing these weapons will be
found in the appendix.

2

Not all of the weapons referred to are illus-

trated, due to lack of adequate photographs, and the information in
the appendices may not prove satisfactory to the student of military
technology.

These omissions were, in part, purposeful, so as to

provide the reader with a generalized �nowledge of the specific
1

Ibid.
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weaponry used by Bolivia and Paraguay in support of their infantry
establishments, without overwhelming him with the finer points of
detail.

Having sketched in the actors and antecedents in the Chaco

drama, we shall now turn our attention to the campaigns within the
war itself, and determine how the artillery and mortars of both
sides were used and misused.

IV. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONFLICT
/

/

The Opening Round: Boqueron--Isla Poi
(September, 1931--July, 1932)

Basically, the Chaco War evolved out of patrol skirmishes,·

Out of these minor clashes often grew major battles for key fortified positions or water points, in which the field artillery and mortar
establishments of the two armies played preponderant roles.

A

complete analysis of each action in which infantry support weapons
aided in deciding the final issue would be unnecessarily elaborate,
as such recorded instances run into the hundreds. Therefore, the
focus of discussion has been confined to the four major campaigns
of the conflict, and the tactical employment, successes, and failures
of the weapons previously described and the men who handled them.
/
In considering the see-saw campaign for Fortin Boqueron, we

must first consider that the actual fighting began well before the
formal commencement of hostilities by both sides, and almost two
years prior to the formal declarations of war in 1933.

1

By examin-

./

ation of the troop concentration m�p , it is apparent that the Fortin
was only one of several inconspicuous stockades making up the Paral

Supra., p. 12.
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.,

I

and retained this essential character until the Armistice of 1935.
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guayan defensive line in the southern half of the Chaco Boreal. Its
strategic value lay in its position upon the main supply road from
I
Puerto Casado on the Rio Paraguay through to Falcon and Nanawa,

and its dominance of several local cariadas, thus controlling the local
water supply.

1

Due to these significant factors, and in response

to so-called Paraguayan "provocations" in the form of patrol clashes,
the commander of the Bolivian First Corps, Colonel David Toro,
acted upon his own authority and ordered two battalions of the 4th
/
Infantry regiment, 4th division, to seize and hold Boqueron. The
,I

fortin was promptly overrun on September 9, 1931, after a sharp

2
· battle with its garrison of some seventy-five defenders. Immediately,
elements of the 2nd Paraguayan Infantry division under Lt. Colonel
Rafael Franco marched from their depot at nearby Isla Poi, and
/

commenced a counter-attack to retake the fortin and the CasadoNanawa road. On September 13th, after completely encircling
/
Boqueron, the assault battalions of the 2nd Infantry regiment attempted
to storm the stockade without heavy preparatory fires from the
divisional artillery, but were driven back with heavy casulties from
3
intense small-arms fire. The Paraguayan infantry·, eager to re1
David H. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, p. 98.

2
3

------ -- --- -----

Ibid.,p99-l 00.
Gonzalez. op. cit., I, .. , 100.
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capture the stockade, had jumped off with only ten minutes of
preparatory fires from the 2nd Artillery regiment, which had dif
ficulty in adjusting its shelling due to lack of signal equipment, the
erratic performance of the old French-style field phones used for
spotting, and inadequacy of training in indirect fire support.

1

The

next day, having profited from their previous mistakes, two 75 mm.
batteries of the 2nd moved to within two thousand yards of the stockade, and began a direct fire against the walls, supplemented by
Stokes-Brandt mortars from the infantry. A chance hit destroyed
the shallow well used by the garrison for water supply, and tormented
by thirst, the Bolivian garrison (three companies of the 1st battalion,
4th Infantry) surrendered in the late afternoon.

2

/
Boqueron was in

Paraguayan hands once more, but the price had been extremely high.
In July of 1932, after the war had attained "hot" status, the

/
Bolivian 4th Infantry division returned to besiege Boqueron, intending this time to make it the focal point of a Bolivian salient choking
off the Paraguayan supply line in the Chaco Boreal (i.e. the Casado
�
Nanawa road) and using the fortin as the base·for a major Bolivian
offensive in the fall of 1932.

The 4th Artillery regiment, taking

advantage of superior fire control equip?,'llent and observation, laid

l

Ibid., pp. 101-103.

2

Ibid.
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down consistent harassing fire from July 8th onward, consisting of
daily concentrations of high explosive and shrapnel.

It directly

supported the main assault of July 12th by breaching the adobe
walls of the stockade with 75 mm. fire over open sights, making
possible successful seizure of the position and one hundred Paraguayan prisoners.

1

/

For one month, the new tenants of Boqueron

were unmolested, save by occasional sniper fire, and Bolivian

�
possession of the fortin seemed secure. However, on September 3rd,
the garrison, composed of two companies from the 8th Infantry
regiment totaling one hundred forty men, was greeted at dawn by
an overwhelming box-barrage of 75 mm. and 105 mm. shells from
the artillery of the Paraguayan 1st Division, which had moved in
overnight to re-occupy the stockade.

2

Mixing their fires well, the

1st Artillery regiment pounded the walls and outlying trenches for
four days, with the only effective Bolivian response coming from a
lone Vickers 75 mm. howitzer within the walls which managed to
break up several probes against the outer trenches, but could not
.reach the Paraguayan cannon for counter-battery fires.

By the

afternoon of September 7th, Bolivian ammunition was exhausted,
and the Paraguayans stormed the breaches in the walls behind a
1

Vidaurre, op. cit., pp. 228-30.

2

Ibid.

81
creeping barrage.

l

The much-battered stockade changed hands for

the last time, and remained in Paraguayan possession for the duration of the war, effectively ending Bolivian attempts to dominate
Paraguay's overland supply route and ensuring the safety of the 1st
and 2nd Division depot areas and I Corps headquarters located at
/
Isla Poi.
/
Some pertinent comments on the Boqueron campaign are in
order at this point, especially in the matter of artillery employment.
To that date, neither of the belligerents had used artillery or mortars
to any extent in their skirmishing, and both were handicapped not so
much by equipment deficiencies by lack of battle experience.

In the

second seizure of the fortin by Bolivian I Corps, we see an effective
demonstration of superiority in fire direction and communications
equipment, while Paraguayan measures in September of 1931 seem
almost laughable by comparison.

By the time of the second offensive

in September of 1932, however, Paraguayan artillery and infantry
alike had become aware of the value of skilled fire direction and coordination with infantry in the assult of fortified positions; a lesson
which had been learned the hard way.

The second-re-taking of the

stockade is a case in point, and might f?eem to the observer to fall
in line with the old proverb of "using a steamroller to crack a walnut".
l

Ibid.
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Estigarribia was wise in utilizing such a heavy concentration of fire
over a prolonged period, as he and the General Staff had no wish for
a repitition of the near-disasterous first counter-attack, with its
high casulties and deflated troop morale.

This cautious substitution

of firepower for men was materially assisted by the Bolivian garrison
and its parent division through the ineffectiveness or absence of
counter-battery fires.

Had one battery been included in the garrison

instead of a single howitzer, or had Toro chosen to throw the entire
/
weight of I Corps artillery into the fray, Boqueron might have held
out for a longer period of time, or could conceivably have been
relieved.

The author has previously mentioned that the first formal
shots fired by artillery on either side took place at the Paraguayan
/

siege of Fortin Mariscal Santa Cruz in July, 1932.

/

As the Boqueron

campaign precedes this date, especially the action of September 9th14th, the chronological honors should be vested herein for technical
purposes.

,/

However, it must be remembered that the Boqueron

campaign, for all practical purposes, originated as a minor skirmish
over a single position, and escalated to a full-scale prolonged battle
only after the war assumed a formal, though undeclared character
after January of 1932.

The significance here lies not with time,

but in the content and effects of the battles fought.
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Paraguay On The Defensive: Arce--Toledo
(December, 1932--March, 1933}
Throughout the humid summer of 1932, the fighting in the
Chaco Boreal sputtered and gradually degenerated into a series of
patrol actions as both sides mustered their resources for the coming
winter months and the re-commencement of the Bolivian offensive
/
southward towards Villa Hayes, Concepcion, and the junction of the
In hopes of forstalling this thrust against their thinly spread-

rivers.

ground forces, the Paraguayan General Staff, under Estigarribia I s
direction, prepared plans for a late-winter holding attack against
/
the Southwestern portion of the Bolivian fortin line in the vicinity
of Arce and Alihuata, to be carried out after the end of the autumn
rains.

This attack was designed to throw the massing forces of the

Bolivian I Corps off balance and to buy the Paraguayan Army time
for re-organization, rather than as a concerted counter-offensive
to recover lo�t ground.

During the months of September and October,

mounting Bolivian pressure against the sector held by the Pa raguayan
✓
1st Division from Falcon northward became heavier, taking the form
of battalion-strength attacks against forward outpos�s supported by
artillery.

1

After nearly three months of waiting, until the point

was reached where forbearance was impossible, the jump-off orders

1

/

/

Carlos- Castane Decoud, Tres Acciones Tacticas De I.a
Guerra Del Ch�co (Asunci�n, Paraguay: Editorial El Gr�fico, 1962),
pp. 30-35.
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were dispatched to 1st Division HQ on the 6th of December, 1932,
and on the morning of December 8th, the division attacked eastward
towards Arce.

1

Neither of the previously mentioned fortines were

captured by the Paraguayans, but the main Bolivian supply route
was overran in several places, thus choking off any movement from
Alihuata north and east toward Platanillos.

Bolivian I Corps, its

internal supply lines menaced and its offensive timetable derailed,
responded by heavily reinforcing the two stockades in question and
moving up both the 4th and 7th Divisions to push back the Paraguayans.
By December 16th, the lines were again stabilized,

2

but the Bolivians

had lost the initiative and the opportunity for an easy breakthrough.
At many points along the front, elements of the Paraguayan
1st· Division had not been forced back by the Bolivian straightening
offensive, and had developed strongly-held salients dominating a
portion of their opponent's forward lines.

One of these satellite

,.

positions was directly in front of the Bolivian-held Fortin Saavedra,
a key outpost along the Arce-Sopresa road, and had resulted from a
Paraguayan assault during the first week of the holding attack.

On

the morning of De':ember 8th, the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion,
6th Infantry Regiment attempted to seize the outer trenches of Saavedra,
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prec e ded by indirect preparatory fires from 1st Divisional artillery
from 5:30 a. m. onward, and a creeping barrage which was to be lifted
when the Bolivian trenches were reached by the infantry.

1

The pur-

pose of this attack was to relieve Bolivian pressure on the 3rd
Infantry regiment on their right flank, permittin•g its orderly with
drawal, and the establishment of a forward outpost to permit obser
vation of the Bolivian positions.

2

After jumping-off, however, the

rolling barrage of artillery was suddenly lifted when the 2nd Company
was two hundred yards from the Bolivian trenches, exposing it
immediately to air-burst fire from a Bolivian battery in Saavedra
and enfilading automatic weapons sited in a quebracho grove behind
the trenches.

This brought the attack to a halt, and forced the 2nd

company to dig in amid a clump of brush where their advance had
stalled.

3

Under constant attack by Bolivian artillery and two Junkers
52 bombers which saturated the open ground around their position
with shrapnel and high explosive, the beleagured infantrymen of the
2nd Company established a perimeter, pushed out patrols to contact
the 3rd Regiment with no success, and directed support fires upon
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the stockade and quebracho grove with signal flags and a buried telephone line to silence Bolivian counter-fires and thus continue the
attack.

1

The 1st Artillery regiment, suffering from ammunition

shortages and relying upon the tenuous phone and flag links with the
2nd Company, temporarily neutralized the Bolivian automatics in
the grove, but could not completely destroy them, whereas the two
batteries of the Bolivian 4th Artillery at Saavedra had unlimited
ammunition and superior communications at their disposal.

2

By

7:50 of the evening of the 8th, the other two companies of the 1st
Battalion had joined the 2nd Company in the perimeter, but could
make no headway against the accurate Bolivian artillery and small
arms fire.

For four days, they clung to their scooped-out trenches

and weapons pits, calling down defensive concentrations of high
explosive and air-burst when the 1st Artillery could spare scarce
ammunition.

3

Under the cover of darkness on the evening of the 13th,

the battalion returned to its parent regiment, and was replaced the
following morning by the 2nd Infantry regiment, the victors of the

/ 4
first storming of Boqueron.
Throughout 1932 and well into 1933

the salient was continually garrisoned by Paraguayan troops, and
1
Ibid.

2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
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made a valuable observation post, although a hazardous one because
of its vulnerability to indirect artillery fires controlled from the
Bolivian trenches.

In lessening pressure against the 3rd Infantry as one of its
primary objectives, the assault of the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry on
December 8th could be considered a tactical success.

From an over-

all standpoint, however, Saavedra could have been readily taken and
a breach opened in the Bolivian southeastern front if adequate artillery
support had been available.

Hesitancy on the part of the divisional

staff probably led to the premature lifting of the rolling barrage,
due to the fear of concentrations landing among friendly troops as
well as in enemy positions.

In

addition to chronic ammunition short

ages, no communications signals had been developed jointly by the
Paraguayan infantry and artillery commanders for the dropping or
raising of artillery concentrations, and forward observers, in this
case, were forced to rely on intuition and a healthy dose of luck in
calling down supporting fires.

It can be said in the 1st Artillery's

favor that throughout the occupation of the salient by the 1st Bat
talion, its defensive support excelled in keeping Bolivian automatic
nests neutralized, thus giving the defen.ders much-needed respite
from harassment and permitting an orderly withdrawal on the night
of the 13th.

As the conflict wore on, these defects in artillery

infantry co-ordination were gradually resolved by the Paraguayan

.

I
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ground forces, to the extent that at Nanawa and later at El Carmen,
real teamwork on the part of these arms became an actuality.

On

the Bolivian side of the picture, we see asserted once

again a definite superiority in communications, indirect fire support,
and logistical resources.

At the same time, a disquieting element

was present in the failure of the 4th Artillery to eradicate or disperse
the Paraguayan salient through weight of fire which was a tactic
clearly suited to the pre-war "Kundt doctrine'' by the exposed nature
of the outpost itself.

Observational accuracy was not at fault here,

but simply the impatience of certain Bolivian regimental and battery
commanders for quick results, which led to extremely rapid firing
and few direct hits upon a closely-concentrated body of troops
hemmed into a small perimeter.

Little attention was paid to counter

battery fire upon the 1st Artillery or upon the 1st Division rearareas to disrupt communications or prevent the reinforcing of the
salient garrison.

This obsession with spectacular fire concentrations,

suitable for neutralization rather than destructive effects, would
_ be the undoing of several Bolivian offensive efforts in the Spring
of 1933, one of which we shall consider shortly.

The action at

Saavedra, by modern terms, would be �onsidered a minor skirmish,
but it proved indisputably to both belligerents that liason between
arms was essential to win an engagement, and that sheer weight of
fire alone was not enough to decide victory.
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After the southwestern portion of the front had reverted to a
state of quiescence, marked only by patrol clashes and raids, the
/

attention of the two armies turned northward, where the f·ortin
lines angled slightly southward for a distance of twelve or so miles,
and then ran in an irregular line north and east across the savanna
to the Rio Paraguay.

At the point where this bend in the lines occured,

almost like the joint in a man's elbow, stood two Paraguayan stockades named Corrales and Toledo. 1 The. former is unimportant to
the present discussion, but the latter was the objective of a primary
offensive effort by an entire Bolivian division.

Fortin Toledo alone

had no great strategic significance, but its successful capture by
the Bolivian I Corps seemed relatively simple in view of the stockade's
isolated position at the tip of a pocket virtually surrounded by Bolivian units, and its dependence upon a single-track trail running through
Corrales to the main road as an avenue of supply.

By cutting this

trail, the position would easily fall into Bolivian hands after a brief
siege, eliminating one link in the line of Paraguayan fortifications
and giving the newly-arrived 3rd Infantry Division, transferred to the
front in January of 1933 from Ingavi, an opportunity to blood itself
in combat.

2

Such were the optimistic plans laid by the I Corps staff.

�
Juan Ayala, La Guerra Del Chaco Hasta Campo Via (Buenos
Aires, Argentina: Artes Graficas Aconcagua, 1958), pp. 173-74.
l
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Their fulfillment, however, was to be another matter entirely.

A

portion of the newly-raised Paraguayan 6th Infantry division moved
into the elbow to garrison Toledo and Corrales at the same time the
/
�
Bolivian 3rd Division had begun to concentrate at Fortin Bolivar.

The divisional components making up the Toledo· garrison consisted
of the 12th Infantry regiment and the l st BauaHon of the 3rd Artillery
Regiment; well-trained and with relatively modern equipment at their
disposal.

l

This move was not due to any advance intelligence received

by Estigarrilia and Paraguayan I Corps staff, but simply a routine
n'love to beef up a weak sector in their defensive lines.

2

Fortunately,

it committed fresh troops and artillery where they were least ex
pected, with damaging results to the unseasoned recruits -of the 3rd
in casulties and morale.

In the interim, Toro had been replaced as I Corps commander,
and ordered back to Santa Cruz for re-assignment. His replacement
was a Chilean field officer, Colonel Enrique Vergera Vicuna, who
was on leave from the Chilean Army for the duration of the hostilities,
and whose services were tendered to the Bolivian field forces for the
twin purposes of combat experience and observation.
l

3
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Unlike Toro,
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whose bombast and overbearing attitude made him hated by I Corps
officers and men alike, Vicuna was a quiet, thoughtful individual whose
mildness of manner belied his talents as a soldier.

With admirable

efficiency, he whipped the 3rd division into fighting trim, bringing
it out of the doldrums of the garrison life it had led for the past
1
three years and preparing the entire corps for a proposed spring
offensive to bring Paraguay to its knees.

The first step on the I

,,

Corps itinerary would be Toledo, and from there "on to Asuncion",
but this_ grand march·was fated never to take place.
By February 11th, the 3rd Division had moved from its
original assembly area and had partially encircled Toledo on three
sides, delaying the final assault until divisional artillery, composed
of the 3rd regiment and organic regimental units, could be moved
into firing position.

2

Initial Paraguayan resistance had been light

to moderate, and Vicuna, personally overseeing the operations,
COtL'lted on an even greater slackening of the same once preparatory
fires were laid down.

The Paraguayan 12th regiment, however, had

, not been idle in the meantime, and had covered the terrain encircling the stockade with elaborate covered trenches and bunkers composed
of earth and quebracho logs, and had sighted in their supporting artil1
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2
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lery and mortars to cover gaps in the approaches and deliver counterfires.

1

On the following morning, several Bolivian line companies

who launched a probing attack against the outer trenches received a
surprise in the form of an earthen emplacement containing two
antiquated Krupp 75 's sited some four hundred yards from the Paraguayan defenses which greeted them with a hail of high explosive and
shrapnel and, combined with small-arms fire from the entrenched
Paraguayan infantry, scattered the attackers within a few minutes.

2

This improvised battery was drawn from the 12th regiment's cannon
company, and was commanded by a young career officer, Lieutenant
/
Conrado Cecilio Baez.

For the next sixteen days of the siege, the

lieutenant and his sweating gun crews fired continuously across open
sights, assisting the infantry in breaking up frontal assaults and
deliver ing harassing rounds against the Bolivian forward positions,
while being constantly exposed to artillery, mortar, and small-arms
fire which killed or wounded half of the original gunners.

"

3

Through-

out the siege, Baez's battery remained a thorn in the side of the 3rd
Division; one which they were unable to pluck out, try as they might.

During the week of February 12-16th, Bolivian artillery and
1
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2
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mortar units of the 3rd Division concentrated on indirect fires against
/
the stockade 1 s outworks, the previously-mentioned Baez battery, and
the trail leading to Corrales (which had not yet been seized by the
infantry). The garrison 1 s artillery and mortars remained silent,
and refused to challenge the Bolivian guns in counter-battery duels
.
. .
1
for reasons of economy in ammunition usage.

Vicura.,rapidly became

distressed at the lack of progress made by the division in taking such
an apparently weak fortification, and decided that one week of preparatory fires was a necessity to level the Paraguayan defenses.

Be

ginning on the morning of February 22nd, the 3rd Artillery commenced
a systematic, round-the-clock bombardment of Toledo and its environs.
For an entire week, daily concentrations were fired against the Paraguayan trenches and bunkers, the stockade proper, a near-by canada,
and the Corrales trail.

These consisted of box-barrages, long-range

grazing fire with shrapnel, and night harassing concentrations using
parachute flares for illumination of targets.

2

In addition, the mortar

platoons of the divisional infantry battalions were set to work at
blasting holes in the Paraguayan wire entanglements directly in front
of the fortin; a task for which the AAC 105 mm. wa::, admirably suited.
Bolivian aircraft joined in the pounding on February 25th, when ten
Junkers 52 bombers dropped twenty-seven five hundred pound bombs
1
2
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on the stockade and trenches in a horizontal attack at dawn in co
ordination with an artillery barrage.

l

Vicuna, in a post-war inter-

view with Juan Ayala, stated that during the week prior to the major
attack of February 26th, 3rd Division artillery and mortars were
delivering two rounds per minute against the Toledo defenses.

This

would be a feat of arms difficult even for a modern, mechanized
artillery unit, and, if true, probably placed an inordinate strain on
divisional and corps logistical systems, already pushed to the limit
by shortages of draft animals and vehicle breakdowns.

2

By his own

estimate, Vicuna felt that such consistent battering would eventually
wear down the Paraguayan garrison, thus making the 3rd' s task on
the 26th appreciably less risky.

Not all of the Bolivian officers

within the division were quite as optimistic.

Colonel Jorge Quintela,
.

,,,

commander of the 3rd, commented to General Andres Osorio of the
General Staff, who was on an inspection tour of the front, that his
divisional artillery "would fire where the skirmish was most thick".
Such eagerness on the part of Bolivian battery commanders not only
posed hazards to their own troops, but tended to neglect obvious
priority targets in favor of sitting ducks.

Other obj�ctions to the

rate and quality of 'the fire support were raised to no avail, and the
attack of the 26th was to go forward as planned.
1
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At 7:30 a. m. on the morning designated, the assault battalions left their own trenches and began to cross the shell-pitted

.

I

strip of savanna separating the fortin and its besiegers.

A rolling

barrage from the divisional artillery, plus a glide-bombing attack
by five Focke-Wulf 310's preceded the jump-off.

Mixed in with the

leading infantry companies were fifteen of the toy-like Vickers 65's
pushed by their gun crews, and drawn from the various regimental
c annon companies.

As the smoke and dust of the preliminary born-

bardment cleared, these pieces opened fire at maximum range over
open sights to silence Paraguayan automatic weapons in th.e outer
trenches, which had begun to heckle the Bolivian advance.

1

With

their assistance, these positions were quickly destroyed, and the
lead companies began to pour through the gaps in·the
_ wire.

At

8:00 a. m. the Par�guayan artillery, which had rarely replied to the
Bolivian shelling in the sixteen days of siege, opened a rapid counterbarrage which began to fall in the Bolivian trenches and artillery
emplacements, cutting off communications from battery to battery,
killing observers, and temporarily neutralizing the 3rd' s artillery
support.

2

Without continuous covering fires, the Bolivian infantry,

after crossing the first trench line, ran head on into accurate crossfire from Paraguayan machine guns and automatic rifles situated in
1
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2
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bunkers constructed at ground level which could not be reached by
indirect artillery fire, and supplemented by a barrage of shells from
/
1
Paraguayan Stokes-Brandts plus Baez's two old Krupps. The
infantry howitzers accompanying the assault units might have silenced
these emplacements and permitted the advance to continue, but they
were stalled on the opposite side of the outer trench line by the width
of the trenches, and could not be muscled across in time to save the

infantry's bacon_.

2

After an hour of futile attempts to penetrate the

second line of Paraguayan defenses, the decimated assault battalions
withdrew to their original jump-off positions under the protection of
an artillery and mortar curtain, leaving behind nine officers and
four hundred and fifty men dead or missing. 3 Although the battle
would drag on until the 12th of March,
more frontal attacks against Toledo.

4

the 3rd Division tried no

The cost had become too great

for an entire army corps to pick off a sitting duck, especially when
the duck started shooting back and hitting.
Where had I Corps, and in particular, the 3rd Division gone
wrong? Nearly two months of precious time, men, and mate rial had
1

3
4
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been expended in a fruitless siege that had concluded in another
stalemate,

Part of the answer lies in the tenacity of the Paraguayan

defense, and the well-trained state of the Toledo garrison, although
to over-emphasize these points would be prejudicial to the equivalent fortitude and bravery of the men and officers of the 3rd, who
might have peen successful if the weight of supporting fires had
been properly adjusted.

The problem lay in Vicuna 1 s reluctance to

heed the advice of Quintela concerning the accuracy of the preliminary
bombardments, and his timidity in asserting his own authority to
halt indiscriminate firing at targets of opportunity.

Vicuna surpassed

Toro as an effective leadership figure, but in his de sire not to offend
national sensitivities within I Corps ranks, he made a fatal tactical
blunder.

If, during the week-long period of shelling and bombing,

the network of Paraguayan bunkers and covered trenches had been
adequately concentrated upon, the possibility exists that some of the
emplacements would have been neutralized by direct hits or nearmisses, leaving gaps in the defense system which might have been
exploited by the Bolivian infantry.

1

In other areas, divisional

leadership was to blame. For example, the 3rd Artillery grew
progressively careless during the siege in the matter of concealing
battery sites and observation posts, making them easy marks for
l
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the Paraguayan counter-barrage.

l

The infantry howitzers could have

crossed the outer trench to perform their assigned mission had the
divisional engineering units devised a method for bridging the trench;
namely, with planks or sandbags.

However, we cannot burden either

corps or division with the stigma of failure for an unsuccessful
offensive operation.

The bulk of the fault is vested in the overall

artillery and mortar doctrine used by the Bolivian Army, and in its
refutation of accuracy in favor of sheer weight.

Already made

obsolete by the conditions of warfare in the Chaco, the Kundt system
survived only by virtue of indoctrination and the presence of its
originator.

Their joint demise was not long in coming, however.

Toledo had been the first nail driven in the coffin of Kundt 1 s military predominance, and Nanawa would provide the impetus to slam
the lid shut forever.
Bolivia's Last Gasp: Nanawa
(May-July, 1933)
Enraged by the 3rd Division I s failure to capture Toledo,
I
Kundt immediately departed for I Corps headquarters at Bolivar to
assume personal command.

His immediate reaction was to order

the dismissal of Vicuna from his post a_s Corps Commander, but
cooler heads in the War Ministry at La Paz forstalled such an
action by re-calling the unfortunate Chilean on the 26th of March and
l
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reassigning him to an administrative position at Santa Cruz on the
1
.
grounds of 111 health.
Obviously, this action was taken to prevent

a breach of the intimate relationships, military and otherwise,
existing with the Chilean government, which Bolivia could not afford
Once on the scene, Kundt proceeded to ruthlessly re-

to lose.

organize both the corps and its component divisions for a master
stroke of his own conception, to be carried out in the late spring of
1933.

By opening a hole in the center of the Paraguayan lines

through sheer weight of metal and manpower, he hoped for a
successful conclusion of the conflict in Bolivia's favor and vindication of his own position as Chief of Staff, which had grown increasingly shaky since the disaster at Toledo.

With such a triumph

to his credit, the numerous critics of his military policy in the
officer corps would be permanently silenced, or so he hoped, allowing a continued prosecution of the war by his designs to the exclusion
of all others.

The focal point of this new offensive was to be the '

Paraguayan stronghold of Nanawa, whose seizure would be the key
/

to the two rivers and Asuncion.

Kundt, for all of his professional

training and past experience, could not forsee the impending collapse
of this grandiose scheme, nor did he take heed of the costly lessons
learned by the 3rd Division at Toledo.
1

Stubbornly clinging to the

Raul Tovar Villa, Campa�a Del Chaco: El General Hans Kundt,
Commandante e� Jefe Del Ejercito e�olivia (LaPaz, Bolivia:
Editorial Don Bosco, 1961 ), pp. 74-:-=fS.
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outmoded tactics of World War I which called for attacks en masse
upon fortified positions, Kundt could not perceive their obvious
unsuitability in bush warfare, especially in situations where the
enemy made advantageous use of the terrain.

Nanawa became to

him a personal grudge iight, and an objective to be attained at any
price, just as Verdun did to Von Falkhayen in 1916.

1

Situated in the center of the southwestern portion of the

/
Paraguayan fortin line, Nanawa fo:::-med the nucleus of a defensive
pocket covering the land approaches to Concepcion, Villa Hayes,
and the capital, plus the vital supply road which led south to Fortin
Delgado.

Unlike other fortines, it possessed the initial advantage

of a slight but commanding elevation (a little less i.n.an one hundred
feet above sea level), as the stockade had been constrt..cted on a
scrub-covered mound overlooking a dry lake bed, with 'L-he :::-oa.d
running behind the mound,
in all directions.

2

giving the garrison a clear field of fire

Since July, 1932, the 4th Infantry regiment of the

2nd Paraguayan Division had occupied Nanawa, together with a
composite artillery group made up of the regimental cannon company
3
.
and the 2nd battalion of the 2nd Artillery.
By dint of hard labor
1

11 Verdun Over Again In El Gran Chaco,
C XV (February 18 , 1933), 12-1 3.

2
3

Zook, op. cit. , p. 195.
Ibid. , pp. 195-98

11

Literary Digest,

101

with hand tools, these units converted "the island", as Nanawa was
nicknamed, into a formidable hedgehog.

Concentric rings of trenches

were dug around the hillock, as at Toledo, and the inner two rings
converted into weapons pits and bunkers with ground-level firing
slits, roofed over with shell-resistant quebracho wood and several
feet of earth or sandbags.

Concertina wire was stretched in front

of the outer trenches where possible, and automatic weapons were
situated to cover such gaps as existed in the wire.

1

The regimental

artillery anc. mortars were emplaced either behind the hillock, or
by sections in the scrub which carpeted the sides and crest.

A dirt

airstrip was carved out of the brush on the other side of the Sopresa
road to allow aerial supply and evacuation of wounded, and telephone
lines were buried to prevent their being severed by shellfire, thus
permitting constant communication between observers in the trenches
and the battery switchboards.

2

By New Year 1 s c:ay,1933, the garrison·

was physically and mentally prepared for the inevitable assault by'
the Bolivian I Corps.

Their mission?

Hold Nanawa at all costs, and

hold it they did through three and one-half months of constant bornbardment and frontal attack that rivaled Verdun or even Ypres in its
intensity and ferocity.
1
2
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The Bolivian division slated by Kundt for the Nanawa operation
was the 7th Infantry, which would be reinforced by two regiments
drawn from the 4th Division and the 1st battalion of the 4th Artillery
regiment.

This latter unit, together with the 7th Artillery, provided

a total of forty-eight fieldpieces for fire support, plus regimental
cannon and mortars.

1

With such overwhelming firepower superiority

available to the assault units, a Bolivian victory seemed inevitable.
Yet, in the preliminary probing attacks delivered in January of 1933,
co-ordination and fire discipline problems almost negated the value
of this concentration; the largest recorded composite of artillery

formed for a single operation throughout the conflict.

2

These

difficulties arose as the result of disagreements between Kundt and
/

Lieutenant Colonel Tomas Olmos, Chief of Staff of the 7th Division,
who was responsible for the operational planning of the attack.

3

The issue at stake centered around varying types of assault formation
and how divisional and corps artillery and mortars could best support
them.

Kundt, naturally, opted for a continuous, heavy concentration

upon a single point in the Nanawa defenses to be followed by a mass
infantry attack after the lifting of fire.

Olmos, who. considered the

Prussian system outmoded, proposed accurate battery fires against
1
2
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the fortifications in general and against specific targets which would
He also suggested the use of staggered

impede the infantry advance.

assault waves covered by a rolling barrage to prevent bunching and
reduce casulties.

1

In spite of the feasibility of Olmos I suggestions,

rank took precedence over reason; a decision which was eventually
to cost I Corps the battle and Kundt his reputation.
While Kundt had refused to accede to all of Olmos 1 plans for
the operation, assuming overall tactical command himself, he left
the preliminaries to the harassed Chief of Staff as tactical 1 1 crumbs 11
unworthy of his own consideration but not that of a subordinate.
Given an opportunity to vindicate his own suggestions, Olmos
demonstrated <luring the first two months of the siege that co-operative
effort by infantry and artillery could reduce fortified positions without heavy cost.

After the 7th Division and attached elements had

moved into position on January 18th and the Delgado road to the
south was cut by roadblocks,

2

the 7th, under Olmos I direction, set

about a gradual reduction of the Paraguayan outer works, particularly
the outer perimeter of trenches, which were manned by two companies
/

of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry spread around the fortin perimeter
as an outpost line.
1
2

3

Beginning on the rµorning of January 22nd, C
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and T Batteries of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Artillery raked the frontal
approaches of the "island" with shrapnel to neutralize Paraguayan
automatic weapons and prevent reinforcements from reaching the
outer trench, and continued this harassment for the next twentyfour hours, firing indirectly at a distance of thirty-five hundred
yards.

1

At 5 :30 A. M. on the morning of the 23rd, the 1st Battalion,

7th Infantry advanced slowly toward the outer trench under the cover
of a rolling barrage laid down by the 3rd Battalion, which ceased as
the leading infantry platoons reached the trench.

The frontal portions of the trench were successfully seized
by the Bolivians without a shot being fired in reply, as the Paraguayan infantry had vacated it several hours beforehand, leaving
behind a few dead and some small arms.

2

Few military textbooks

could have furnished such an example of co-ordinated effort on the
part of infantry and artillery which was ultimately successful in
reducing a fortified position with little cost to the attacking elements.
While the outer trench was being softened up and seized, divisional
artillery concentrated on the destruction of the inne r trench rings,
the stockade proper, and the road, airstrip, and regimental supply
dumps of the 4th Infantry on the revers� side of the hillock in
1
2
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l

The assault

would be delivered by the 41st Infantry of the 7th Division from
the recently-captured outer trenches, supported directly by one
battery of 75 1 s from the 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery, commanded
/
2
/
by Lieutenant Augustin Lopez.

Unfortunately, Kundt superseded Olmos at this stage of
the operation, and ordered the prematu·re lifting of the preparatory
fires on January 22nd, giving the Nanawa garrison a much-needed
breathing spell to repair their battered emplacements and receive
additional ammunition and rations from a pack train which arrived
I
3
from Falcon on the 23rd.
\Vhen the 41st Regiment began its attack
on the morning of the 24th, it easily crossed the open ground between the second and third trench lines, but its advance was soon
stalled by interlocking automatic fire from Paraguayan bunkers and
covered trenches untouched by preparatory fires, and Stokes -Brandt
mortars fired from pits along the crest of the hillock.

Initially,

casulties were relatively light as the Bolivian infantry took cover
in old shell holes, but m_o u n t e·d .. , as the Paraguayan mortars
ranged in on the stalled line of troops.
1
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Battery Lopez could not
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effectively knock out either the bunkers or mortar emplacements
for fear of hitting its

own men, and a direct hit on a bunker firing

slit was necessary to destroy it, as the Vickers 75 mm. shells with
their instantaneous fuses would not penetrate the iron-hard quebracho

logs.

Clouds of powder smoke and dust screened the

11

island 11 from

the view of 7th Artillery forward observers, making indirect fire
against the fortifications impossible.

1

Finally, at 11:35, the 41st

withdrew slowly towards their jump-off position, covered by a box.
2
barrage and chemical smoke.
As a probe, the attack was successful,
since it revealed to the 7th Division the approximate strength of the
Paraguayan inner defenses and the fact that more preparatory fires
were needed to destroy the system of interlocking bunkers that had
impeded the adv_ance.

Olmos, recognizing the necessity of thorough

artillery preparation, pressed for systematic reduction of the defences through timed fires on these grounds, but could make no
impression upon the inflexible Kundt.

3

In the end, Olmos found him-

self relegated to a subordinate position in the divisional hierarchy
once again, and his brilliant preparatory labors we re soon wasted
by the ambition and bull-headedness of his superior officer.

1

Ibid.

107
Throughout February, March, and April of 1933, the 7th
Division pounded away at Nanawa with infantry probes, consistent
artillery and mortar barrages, and supplemental aerial attacks
delivered by Bolivian bombers and fighters which systematically
leveled the outer trench, blew large gaps in the ·concertina wire,
and denuded the hillock of its scrub covering, but left the Para
guayan bunkers,_ built safely at ground level, intact and in firing
order.

1

As time wore on, Kundt 1 s impatience grew, and the morale

of the 7th plummeted to dead zero as a result of inactivity and
boredom.

The easy victory that would have touched off a triumphal

�
march to Asuncion had degenerated into another wearisome siege,
apparently without any end in sight.

Under other circumstances, the tremendous weight of preparatory fires would have rendered any fortifications impotent to
resist a determined frontal assault, but weight alone was no longer
a guarantee of success.

Breaches in fire discipline, which had

been evident at Arce and disasterous at Toledo, now became widespread within the ranks of the 7th Division and its support units as
spring wore into summer.

With the division al artillery broken up

into small firing packets to. support lin:e companies, and com.i.--nunications frequently breaking down between battery commanders and
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7th Artillery HQ, the rigid discipline proposed and enforced by
Kundt was shattered time and again by eager piece or battery
leaders who could not resist taking a crack at an especially tempt
ing target.
Several examples illustrate this difficulty. For instance,
in May of 1933, a Bolivian battery commander, observing by field
glasses that three Paraguayan Ftat observation planes had landed
on the Nanawa airstrip, immediately opened fire upon the field
with high explosive.

None of the three aircraft were damaged by

the shelling, and there was no aerial retaliation, since the aircraft
were carrying no bombloads, but one of the three immediately took
off again, spotted the smoke raised by the recoil of the Bolivian
fieldpieces, and using a streamer drop and dummy strafing runs,
directed counter-battery fire from Paraguayan artille ry onto the
interloping battery, forcing it to limber up and displace to the rear.

l

Paraguayan gunners were no less prone to fire upon handy or obvious
targets, but did so less frequently (at least at Nanawa) because of
ammunition shortages. Kundt 1 s ire was increased by these disci
plinary breaches, not so much for the indiscriminate firing but
because the responsibility for the deci�ion to fire had not been
transmitted by higher authority. Consequently, several drum-head
1
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..
court-martials of intemperate
Bolivian artillery officers took place
during this period, stemming from these occurences.

1

Of more

immediate importance, unimportant targets were worked over
until leveled, while priority objectives, such as the Paraguayan
bunkers, were given only cursory attention.

The old mud-and-wattle

settlern.ent of Nanawa, for example, was gradually eradicated by
the fires of an entire battalion during April and May of 193 3, even
though the village, located as it was at the edge of the dry lake bed,
was unoccupied by Paraguayan troops.

2

Valuable time and ammu-

nition were used in what amounted to target practice, leaving the
Paraguayan interior fortifications relatively untouched. Here was
not a question of wanton destruction, but one of wasted effort on the
part of the artillery and mortars. Joint bombardment by Bolivian
aircraft in conjunction with divisional artillery proved to be spectacular but something less than effective, as the bombs frequently
fell wide of the hillock due to observational difficulties caused by '
dust and smoke raised by the shelling and did no damage to the wellentrenched Paraguayan infantry. Nanawa had become a stumbling
block to Kundt and the entire I Corps; a block they were determined
to surmount without thought of the costs.

1
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From the Bolivian standpoint, time was rapidly running out
in the Nanawa sector.

Corps and divisional logistics had been

stretched thin to maintain the 7th in its prolonged siege operations,
especially in the matter of ammunition for its ever-hungry guns.
With summer im..."'ninent, water for men and animals would soon be
,,w
in short supply, and the hillock dominated the only canada in the
vicinity.

Therefore, the old Junker found himself under increasing

pres sure from the War Ministry and Dr. Salamanca to produce some
tangible results in the campaign or be forcibly removed from his
command. In desperation, Kundt began to prepare, in late May
of 193 3, for a large-scale attack designed to overwhelm the "island"
by sheer force of numbers.

1

By June 12th, a daily program of

continuous harassing, time-on-target, and night fires was delivered
against the hillock and its attendant trenches, in co-ordination with
weekly bombing attacks by Bolivian Junkers and Focke-Wulfs.

2

Through the month of June, these fires increased in their intensity,
and Paraguayan intelligence reports noted the movement of new
units into the Bolivian lines in front on Nanawa, including a tank
company and engineer detachments.

3

Prompted by _these estimates

and the increased weight of the daily barrages, Rafael Franco, now
1
2
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a full colonel and commander of the Paraguayan I Corps, ordered
the construction of additional roofed weapons pits and the strengthening of existing positions with an extra nine feet of earth and logs.
Most of this work was done at night to avoid exposure to Bolivian
fire, and replacements as well as extra supplie-s of ammunition
arrived periodically during the hours of darkness.

1

By July 2nd, the 7th Division was fully poised for the final
assault, but their Paraguayan counterparts were likewise well
prepared.

At first light on July 4th, the fires of the 7th Artillery

slackened momentarily, then switched from the trenches and wire
obstacles to the stockade.

This was supplemented at 8:10 A. M.

by a bombing and strafing attack carried out by twelve Bolivian
Junkers and Focke- Wulfs.

2

In the meantime, the regiments

selected for the assault (the 41st and 43rd Infantry of the 7th
Division, and the 8th Infantry of the 4th), moved up to the captured
outer trench.

They were supported by five Renault tanks, three

mediwns and two lights, twelve to fifteen Vickers infantry howitzers,
and a platoon of engineers equipped with flamethrowers.

3

To

further ease their task, the divisional engineer company had dug
1
2
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a tunnel underneath the second Paraguayan trench and mined it
with five hundred pounds of guncot�on, to be exploded electrically
l
at the moment of jump-off.
At 11 :00 A. M., a divisional engineer
officer pushed the plunger, and a fountain of earth, sand and dust
geysered up from the Paraguayan sec.and trench;

A rolling barrage

of artillery and mortar fire opened from the Bolivian support units,
and the assault infantry, led by the £ive tanks, slowly crossed the
torn-up ground.

At fifteen hundred yards, the barrage lifted, and

the little Vickers 65's commenced direct fire against the Paraguayan
bunkers and gun pits, silencing a few of them, but not all.

2

As the

leading infantry companies approached to within point-blank range
of the second trench, the emplaced Paraguayan machine guns and
automatic rifles cut loose with a devastating cross-fire, mowing
down the front ranks like ripe corn.

From the rear of the hillock,

the 2nd Batallion' s 75' s and regimental Stokes-Brandts delivered
a box-barrage of high explosive and air-bursts which raked the
front slopes.

The crater-pocked landscape bogged down the in-

fantry howitzers, and accurate small arms fire killed or wounded
most of the crews within a few minutes.
1
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Easily breasting the

113
trench, the two Bolivian Renault mediums in the lead sprayed the
Paraguayan pillboxes with machine-gun and cannon fire, which had
little effect upon them, as the Hotchkiss 3 7 mm. shells simply
bounced off the bunker roofs.

Pressing forward, these two armored

vehicles churned up the slight slope toward the inner trenches and
stockade, and promptly had their front driver wheels and bogies
blown away by several rounds from three Paraguayan Semak 28/20 1 s
concealed in a shrapnel-torn clump of brush about half-way up the
hill.

Both crews abandoned their tanks posthaste and fled downslope,

as 75 mm. shells turned each tank into a flaming torch.

1

The 41st

Regiment, which had led the assault, had stalled at the second trench
line around the mine crater, and the other two regiments, following
in echelon, piled up behind and around them, leaving Paraguayan
artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons with a massive, milling
target.

Bolivian artillery and mortar observers, fearful of hitting

their own men, refused to call down covering fires, and could not'
properly direct the laying of a smoke screen because of the huge
billows of dust and smoke which obscured the objective.

2

At 1:35,

with the three assault regiments almost decimated, Kundt ordered
the withdrawal of the battered infantry to the captured trench.

Some

units, however, needed no orders, but started pulling back at 1:10 P.M.
carrying their wounded and personal weapons and little else.
l
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sixty-four hundred officers and men lay dead on the wire, in front
of the bunkers, and around the crater, along with seven Vickers
howitzers and the burned-out corpses of two Renault tanks.

1

In

less than two-and-one half hours, the "island" bastion had robbed
a Bolivian division of over half of its strength,· to no avail for the
attacker.

For Hans Kundt, Nanawa was the last stop in. a productive
but checkered military career.

Angered by the heavy casulty rates

incurred by I Corps, the War Ministry, under Dr. Salamanca's
orders, relieved the General of his post as Chief of Staff and ordered
him to report to Santa Cruz, from whence he was taken to La Paz
under "protective custody".

There, he was found guilty of insub-

ordination by a military tribunal, stripped of his permanent rank
of Major General, and placed under house arrest in December of
1933.

2

It is not difficult to speculate what his fate might have been

had the assault on Nanawa continued.

Unquestionably, Kundt was

the progenitor of the modern Bolivian Army, and had contributed
extensively to its administrative and technical development.

As a

field commander, he left a great deal to be desired, which un
fortunately could only be proven the ha:i;d way.
1
2
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the 7th' s failure at Nanawa was due to the shortcomings in the
Prussian-style artillery and mortar doctrine that he had assidously
preached.

Some of these deficiencies, such as the inadequacy of

mass fire as opposed to accuracy, have been previously mentioned.
Others are more painfully apparent.

For instance, Kundt's refusal

to use a timed-fire system in accordance with Olmos I suggestions
smacks almost of professional jealousy; an unworthy trait for any
officer in the field, and especially in one vested with a heavy tactical
responsibility.

Direct, open-sight fire with case shot and shrapnel

might have eliminated the deadly Paraguayan bunkers, but in no
case, either in the preliminary fires, probing attacks, or in the
final assault, was this method used.

Mortar sections in the forward

trench might have been moved up with the first attack waves and fired
in counter-battery against the stockade and its attendant weapons pits,
but they remained in the rear firing haphazardly at unspecified
targets with insufficient observation.

Wh en co-operation between

infantry and artillery was needed, it was most conspicously absent.
The defenders of Nanawa, on the other hand, possessed a
smaller number of artillery and mortars, but made more skillful
use of them in a defensive situation.

Fourth Regiment mortar sections

can be particularly cited in this regard, as the rapidity of their fire
assisted materially in stopping the two frontal assaults previously
described.

Overall, the Paraguayan artillery components within
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the garrison maintained · excellent

fire discipline, conserved

their limited ammunition, and when the opportunity presented itself,
backed up their infantry with previously-registered fires to plug gaps
in the defensive perimeter. This refusal to engage in counterbattery duels with Bolivian artillery is feasible_ tactically, but why
the 2nd Battalion did not oppose the seizure of the outer trench by
the Bolivians on January 23rd is somewhat strange, in view of the
exposed position of the attacking forces and their vulnerability to
counter-fires. Part of this difficulty may be explained in the following comments by Vidaurre, which considered a problem faced by
artillerists of both armies:
"In the initial phase of the war, when operations
were begun against Nanawa to the South, and against
Toledo in the North, the fire of the artillery lacked
one element, the proper angle. The angle of fire
had not been taken carefully for the reason that the
uniformity of the terrain... is the same without pre
senting anywhere a depression or elevation from
which it could fire. 11 1
With the collapse of the Bolivian offensive against Nanawa,
the Chaco War entered into a new phase dependent upon fluid move
ment rather than static defense.

/
The fortin lines, over which so

much blood had flowed in the preceding two years, were soon to be
abandoned as the conflict moved northward along the valley of the
Pilcomayo towards the Andean foothills. The removal of Kundt at
1
Vidaurre, op. cit.,· p. 256.
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an earlier date might have salvaged part of what had been painfully
won from the jungle and the Paraguayans, but after July 4th, 1933,
dismissals were poor substitutes for victory.

History has been

overly harsh with the old Junker, and blamed him disproportionately
for the Bolivian disintegration on the battlefield.

It would be well

to remember that verdicts, at least in history, are never final ones.
Kundt fought the type of war that instinct and training had conditioned
him to do, and it was his misfortune that the system he created
was out of joint with both the times and circumstances.

The initiative

had nonetheless changed hands, and would remain in Paraguay's
favor until the conflict's end, as the pursuer had suddenly become
the pursued.
R.etreat And Advance To The Pilcomayo:
Ballivi�n-Canadalli. -Carmen
(April-November, 1934)
Kundt's replacement, General Enrique Penaranda, found him-

,

self confronted with a rapidly disintegrating tactical situation when
he arrived on the scene on August 15th.

In terms of manpower, I

Corps had been sadly crippled at Nanawa, as the 7th Division was a
skeleton due to battle casulties and the 4th equally battered from
almost two years of continuous bush fighting.

,,

,

The 3rd Division was

still recuperating at Fortin Bolivar from the after-effects of the
Toledo Campaign, and would not be combat-ready for another month,
while the fresh but untried 5th Division was tied down far to the north-
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/

east covering the Vanguardia-Puerto Suarez sector.

l

At Villa

Montes, Colonel Toro, arrogant and irascible as ever, was busily
assembling II Corps from Reservist forces.

This corps, composed

. of the 9th and l 0th Infantry Divisions and the veter an 2nd Cavalry
Division, would bear the brunt of the fighting ar.ound Ballivian in
months to come.

2

However, its infantry components were green,

unseasoned troops, well-equipped but ill-trained.

Their reliability

as reinforcements to bolster the sagging southwestern front would
be questionable under even favorable circumstances. Penaranda,
now wearing two hats as Acting Chief of Staff and I Corps commander,
was forced to make do with what he had to face and repel the forthcoming Paraguayan counter-offensive.

His lines of supply were

still open to the north, but the autum� rains were fast approaching.
Within a short time, the Villa Montes road would be an impassable
quagmire, as would every road and trail in the Chaco.

Thus, I

Corps ran the risk of being cut off and left to wither on the vine by
nature rathe r than Paraguayan encirclement. Periaranda therefore
decided to begin an orderly withdrawal in a northwesterly. direction
along the Pilcomayo and create a more stable defense line in the
,.
3
vicinity of Linares and Ballivi,n, two of the upriver fortines.
l

Zook, op. cit. , p. 204.
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Before I Corps could carry out this maneuver, the Paraguayan
offensive swung into high gear, and turned it into a disorganized
retreat.
Estigarribia had managed to muster su££icient troop strength

behind Franco's I Corps to permit the kick-off manuever of the
counter-offensive by the 28th of August.

Realizing the weakened

condition of his opponent's defensive lines, he ordered probing
attacks along the southwestern front from Nanawa eastward.

l

In

the first week of September, elements of the 2nd Division located
a momentary gap in the Bolivian lines between Platanillos and
/

Bolivar, held by the 4th Bolivian Division.

The place in question

was an old ruined stockade dominating the road and a nearby
�

/

. canada called Campo Via.

Moving across country without artillery

support, the 2nd Division, with two regiments of the 6th as reinforcements, quickly sever
. ed the vital supply road and cut off the bulk
of the 4th Division at Platallillos, where it surrendered after sporadic
resistance on September 12th, with three thousand prisoners and
some twenty fieldpieces falling into Paraguayan hands.
.,

2

/

With a hole opened in the center of the fortin line, and Paraguayan infantry infiltrating into the soft, ungarrisoned rear, I Corp's
1

Ibid., pp. 206-208

2
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position was no longer tenable.

On September 18th, the general

order for a retreat was given, and the remnants of the 7th and 4th
Divisions, plus the relatively intact 3rd, began to pull out and move
northward towards Linares.

l

Paraguayan I Corps was not far behind,

although slowed down by rear-guard actions.fought by the 3rd Divi
sion and occasional roadblocks.

The toughened l st Division, lead-

ing the pursuit, made frequent use of its mortar and regimental
cannon components to destroy these roadblocks and harass the
Bolivian rear echelons by marching cross-country parallel to the
main road and suddenly delivering point-blank fires into transport
columns, causing heavy damage and mass panic among the bewildered
masses of Bolivians fleeing for safety.

2

By December 1, 1933, I

Corps had seized Linares, its initial objective, and halted there
for re-grouping.

3

The long pursuit nor
_ th had been no lark for the

weary Paraguayans, as Bolivian resi:stance grew stiffer as the
/
battle lines advanced closer to Ballivian.

This was especially

noticable in the mounting number of air raids by the Bolivian Air
Force on Paraguayan columns and supply depots during this period,

-

and in the bloody repulse given to the Paraguayan 1st Division at
Canada Strongest on February 24th, 1934, where an entire regiment
1
Ibid.
2
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121
was surrounded and two of its battalions· captured by the Balivian

.

9th Division, part of Taro's newly arrived II Corps.

l

i

Estigarribia•s

strategic planning called for the seizure of Villa. Montes, and possibly
the nearby Parapiti oil fields in order to give Paraguay a better
position at the conference table should an armistice be signed in
the coming year.

2

/
To accomplish these objectives, Ballivian and

its attendant strongpoints had to be taken, and with a relatively fresh
Bolivian Army Corps barring the way, this would not be a simple
matter of head-on attacks.

Subterfuge and envelopment were the

weapons that he would use against Toro, with artillery and mortar
support being relegated to a secondary role.

This is not to imply

that either belligerent stopped using their infantry support arms,
but simply that orthodox technique, in this case, was abandoned by
both sides for the sake of battlefield expediency.

,,,

Taro's II Corps had begun to concentrate on Ballivian in
December of 1934, and had developed the fortin and its outposts
into a formidable defensive position equal in strength to Nanawa.
Covered by the Pilcomayo and neutral Argentine territory directly
to the west, the main stockade could only be reached by infantry
assault by taking each one of its heavily fortified outworks, six
1
2

Ibid., p. 214.
Ibid., p. 216

122
in number, by storm.

The divisional artillery o.f the 8th and 9th

Divisions was grouped together in a two-regiment brigade adjacent
to the main stockade, where it could fire concentrations in all
directions.

1

I Corps tasted the power of this grouping on July 10th,

1934, when the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment occupied
one of the outposts, El Condado, and drove its garrison back on
Ballivian.

Instantaneously, II Corps artillery dropped a box-barrage

of high explosive and air-burst upon the Paraguayan troops, who
had not enough time to dig in properly.

On re-occupying the village

after the two hour concentration, the Bolivian 12th Infantry regiment
counted seventy-five Paraguayan dead and retrieved several stands
of small arms from the shell-torn outpost.

2

Episodes such as this

made Franco, Estigarribia, and the I Corps staff a trifle wary of
attempting frontal assaults against any of the Ballivi{n fortifications,
and prompted the establishment of a holding perimeter facing the
Bolivian defense complex in a rough half-circle.

The worn-out

veterans of the 1st Division who had lead the advance north from
/

Campo Via were pulled out of the line and sent into Corps reserve.
Their place was taken by the newly-arrived 7th Division, which was
sent into the middle of the holding line at Santa Rosa, while the 2nd
1
2
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Division moved to the east of the Villa Montes road in the direction
/
of Fortin Picuiba, and the 8th Division, another new formation
covered the western sector reaching to the river.

1

With its own

lines thus strengthened, I Corps settled down to wait, conducting
raids and patrol actions in the meantime to test Bolivian strength
and throw them off balance.

The summer of 1934 wore on without any major clashes
between the two belligerents, apart from a daily interchange of
artillery and mortar shells, sniping, and occasional patrol actions.
In one sense, this stage of the campaign resembled the opening rounds

of a boxing match where each of the fighters sparred and jabbed,
but refrained from landing decisive punches.

The Paraguayan position,

while firmly anchored to the river and Picuiba, was tenous in terms

of manpower and ammunition reserves, neither of which did
,

' have to spare for offensive operations.
Estigarribia

The Bolivian

IL· .... Corps, on the other hand, possessed the immediate advantage
of the Expeditionary Force depots at Villa Montes as a source of
reinforcements and supplies, although rain and constant use soon
turned the road into a soupy morass which was impassable a good
deal of the time.

As a consequence of .this material superiority,

Toro contemplated a sweeping offensive in early November designed

1 Jose/

Paraguay:

,

Clemente Britos, Batalla De El Carmen (Asuncion,
fulprenta La Humanidad, 1963),p. 14.
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to envelop the Paraguayan I Corps, pin it against the Pilcomayo, and
finish it off, thus leaving the road clear for the often-postponed

/ 1
march on Asuncion. On paper, his offensive plans appeared

promising enough, but in actuality, there was little substance or
reality involved. To begin with, Taro's blunt dislike of Penaranda
prevented any effective liason between Corps HQ and the Chief of
Staff; a necessary condition for the success of a large-scale military operation of this type.

He considered the new Staff head an

incompetent blunderer, fit only to be replaced by a man of proven
ability, and refused to reveal to him most of the operational details;

2

a piece of rank insubordination which under ordinary circumstances
might have cost him his commission.

~

Penaranda, unsure of his

own position politically as well as militarily, could not arbitrarily
remove Toro from his command, as governmental communiques
and popular news media in La Paz had turned him into a national
/

hero for his defense of Ballivian.

Besides, he had no other seasoned

field commanders on which he could rely. · His only recourse was to
send frequent written reprimands to the intransigent Corps commander, most of which were ignored, and to request that Dr.
Salamanca support him in removing Toro from his post.
l
2

Zook, op. cit., p. 217.
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Sala-
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manca I s temporizing on the subject would eventually lead to his
own overthrow in the officer's coup of February 3rd, 1935, in
which Toro had a prominent role, and contributed materially to a
growing split in the Army high command at a time when unity was
essential.

l

Estigarribia' s difficulties with other ranking officials were
mainly of a personal nature, and did not involve deep-set political
ambitions, as did his Bolivian counterparts.

One of the least of

Estigarribia' s worries was a lack of concrete intelligence concerning his enemy• s movements.

Like an inept prizefighter, Toro

telegraphed all of his forthcoming offensive punches without any
attempts at concealment, mostly out of cocksureness at his own
physical superiority and personal arrogance.

No measures were

,,

taken to camouflage the shifting of units within the Ballivian per,,,,
imeter to the obvious weak point in the Paraguayan lines, Fortin

Picuiba; movements which were carried out throughout September
and October of 1934 in broad daylight under constant surveillance
by Paraguayan aircraft and ground patrols.

2

At the same time, a

number of infantry probes were delivered against the Paraguayan
holding line, always preceeded by intei:ise artillery and mortar
l
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preparation. For example, on November 6th, a thirty-minute timeon-target concentration composed of 75 mm., 105 mm. and mortar
fire struck the trenches held by the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the 7th
Division in the Santa Rosa sector early in the morning.

At 7:40 on

the evening of the 6th, a similar concentration hit the neighboring 9th
Infantry, and a pat3:"ol from the 17th Infantry captured a Bolivian
straggler who revealed that the systematic barrages were to provide
cover for ground reconnaissance of the Paraguayan defenses.

The

4th Artillery Regiment of the 7th Division returned the compliment
with a high-explosive concentration that raked the woods in front of
the 7th's positions, foiling the probe.

1

,,

Toro's intentions were now crystal-clear to Estigarribia
Franco, and their subordinates. A major counter-offensive was in
the making, but where would the Bolivians strike first?

I Corps

had a fairly sizeable mobile reserve in the 1st Division, but it
could not be parceled out in packets to reinforce the paper-thin
holding line from the river eastward.

Unless the Bolivians made

the initial move, the waiting game would have to continue. However,
Toro was not long in tipping his hand. On November 12th, the 8th
✓

Regiment of the Paraguayan 2nd Divisi�n, in garrison at Fortin
Picuiba, found itself under heavy artillery and mortar fire from
l
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two regiments of the Bolivian 10th Division, supported by the 2nd
Cavalry Division, as reported to I Corps HQ at 10 A.M. by telephone
before the wires were cut.

1

Estigarribia was in a desperate position,

since releasing the 1st Division to break the siege of Picuiba would
leave him without a reserve to meet a secondary assault by the bulk
of II Corps.

Yet, he could not leave the 8th Regiment to its fate,

and transmitted an order for them to break out of the pocket at the
earliest possible opportunity and rejoin their parent division. 2 By
l :00 P. M., the infantry spearheads of the attacking Bolivian units
had nearly surrounded the fortin, but a half-mile gap, heavilyforested and laced with trails, separated the two prongs of the con
verging pincers.

3

Had Toro kept his composure and intrusted the

closing of this gap to his subordinates, the 8th Regiment might have
been captured intact with minimal resistance..

However, he desired

to claim sole credit for such a successful operation for himself, and
the two attacking forces were halted in the late afternoon of the 12th
to allow Toro to journey up from Ballivi�n to direct the closing of
the trap in person.

4

This hesitation by virtue of personal vanity

was to have ironic and far-reaching effects for the personnel of II
Corps and the fate of Ballivi�n.
1
2
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Toro arrived at the 2nd Cavalry field HQ in front of Picuiba
at 7:45 on the morning _of the 13th, after an all-night ride by com�and

,, l

car from Ballivian.

Immediately he ordered the two pincers to

converge on the stockade, and at 8:15 A.M. the assault forces
jumped off, preceeded by a time-on-target artiilery and mortar
concentration laid on by the cannon companies of the 19th and 21st
Infantry regiments of the 10th Division.

When the two converging

,,

pincers met an hour later, they found only a ruined fortin, several
burning ration dumps, and twelve broken-down Ford trucks left
behind by the Paraguayans, who had seemingly vanished into thin
2
air. During the night of the 12th, while Toro dreamed of an easy
conquest, the 8th Infantry filtered out through the gap in Bolivian
lines in small groups, carrying with them all their weapons, ammunition, wounded, and a few prisoners.

Nothing had been left

behind, not even the four Krupp 75' s of the regimental howitzer
company, which were dismantled and packed out on the backs of
their crews.

3

II Corps had been left holding the bag, and the

/

Ballivian line was now appreciably weakened and ripe £or infiltration.
While Toro raged and swore at the duplicity of a foe who

1
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would not hold still long enough to be encircled, Estigarribia was
already putting a counter-manuever in motion.

The softest spot

in the Bolivian defenses at the moment was the outwork named

-

Canada del Carmen, which jutted into the Paraguayan lines eastward in the 2nd Division's sector.

The Bolivian 9th Division held

this satellite in some strength, but their flanks were up in the air
due to Taro's committment of the bulk of the 10th Division at
Picuiba.

1

Estigarrib,ia and Franco, working jointly, conceived a

double-envelopment pincers centered on Canada• del .Carmeri.with�the
right wing composed of the 2nd Division and the left the 8th Division.
The 7th Division would displace to the western sector of the holding
line into the 8th' s old positions, and prepare to support the attack
if it was successful.

2

Field command of the operation was vested

in Colonel Eugenio Garay, commander of the 8th Division, who
/

/

was a veteran of Boqueron and Campo Via and a specialist in bush
warfare.

Some commentators on the Chaco have referred to Garay

as the Stonewall Jackson of Paraguay, by virtue of his skill in

.

handling infantry as highly mobile assault units.

3

This description

was n.ot inaccurate, as the events of the next seventy-two hours will
1
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indicate.

After the divisions had shifted to their pre-arranged

positions on the afternoon of the 13th, the operational orders pre
pared by the I Corps staff were transmitted to the two divisional
commanders.

The jump-off time for both units was set at 7:00 P. M.

after darkness had fallen.

Only small arms and mortars would be

carried, and of the utmost importance, there would be no preparatory
fires above and beyond the normal harassing concentrations used
nightly.

Once in the Bolivian rear, mortar concentrations would

be laid on all roads and trails, and roadblocks established to pre
vent the 9th Division's escape.

Corps and divisional artillery,

however, would hold their support fires until the two Paraguayan
divisions had overrun their objective.

1

This was done to prevent

injury to friendly troops, and to insure that valuable ammunition
would not be used in chewing up empty entrenchments. Like an
unwary hunter, Toro and II Corps were about to fall into a trap
of their own divising.
Concealed by ground-mist and an overcast sky, the 2nd and
8th Divisions moved out from their lines at exactly 7 P. M., crossed
no man's land between the two defensive positions, and began to
filter through the uncovered flanks of the 9th Bolivian.Division six
miles apart.

Following old foot trails, or cutting new ones where

1Ibid., p. 88
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none previously existed, the Paraguayan infantry, with faces
blackened by mud and equipment taped to prevent noise, passed in
single file into the Bolivian perimeter, while scattered harassing
and illumination fire from their divisional artillery struck the 9th
Di vision in back of them.

Due to the sudden pull-out of the bulk

of the 10th and the 2nd Cavalry, this unit's flanks were not tied in

with the 50th Regiment to the east and Corps troops in the western
sector, and the gaps were not patrolled or even illuminated by
parachute flares.

l

II Corps headquarters possessed no specific

instructions on how to deal with this problem, as Toro, in his
haste to be victorious at Picuiba, had left none behind.

2

No doubt,

there was some bewilderment on their part at the scantiness of
Paraguayan harassing fire that evening, but nothing to this effect
was recorded officially or otherwise.

In the meantime, Garay

and his two divisions had reached their designated assembly point
.

/

one mile from the fortin, and fanned out to block the trail leading·
from the stockade to Ballivian, thus sealing off the only escape
3
route for the 9th Division.

The mortar sections of each division

assembled their tubes, sighted them in on the stockade, the trail,
1
2
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and the numerous dumps and bivouacs around the canada, and settled
down to await the dawn and firing orders.
The Bolivian 9th Division received a rude reveille on the
morning of November 14th.

Divisional headquarters awoke to the

tune of accurate 81 mm. fire which blanketed the stockade, set fire
to tents and supply dumps, and panicked draft animals into a wild
stampede for the woods. After the barrage had diminished, two
converging columns of Paraguayan infantry appeared from out of

.,

nowhere, and overran the for tin after a brief skirmish, capturing
the entire divisional administrative and line staff by 9: 25 A. M.

1

A few stragglers escaped down the trail to Ba11iv/4n to alert 11 Corps,
but the warning came too late for the line regiments of the 9th.

On

hearing the sounds of mortar fire in the rear, fear swept through
the Bolivian ranks, as officers and men alike realized that the
Paraguayans had infiltrated behind them and had overrun Ca-;;:ada del
Carmen. Some of the officers attempted to turn their units about
and attack westward to recover the stockade, but few succeeded in
organizing any sort of effective opposition. The bulk of the 9th
Division officers deserted their units, and struck out cross-country
2
/
.
to Ballivian and safety, leaving the Indian draftees to their fate.

1
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As units disintegrated, more and more thirsty, weaponless Bolivians
trudged into Canada del Carmen to give themselves up.

By noon of

the 14th, the 2nd and 8th Divisions combined had taken over seven
thousand prisoners, a complete divisional field hospital, several
hundred head of draft animals, and two battalions of Indian labor
troops imported from the Altiplano for roadbuilding.

1

In addition,

Lieutenant Colonel Estaban Ortellado, commander of the 2nd Division,
reported to Estigarriba and Franco by field telephone that his 2nd
regiment had overrun the divisional artillery park located near
the stockade, seizing two Vickers

75 1 s, fifteen head of draft oxen,

and a large artillery ammunition dump, while the 2nd Battalion of
the regiment had captured two more Vickers

75 1 s, four Ford Model-A

trucks, and twenty Bolivian artillerymen in an ambush of a transport
column on the Seleck trail leading north to Canada Oruro.

2

Having

successfully closed the sack on Canada del. Carmen, Garay released
tactical command to Colonel Franco, who ordered both divisions ·
to strike to the northwest and cut the Ballivian-Villa Montes road,
thus trapping the remnants of II Corps against the river.

3

Word of the 9th Division 1 s debacle at C�ada del. Carmen did
1
2
3

Ibid.

.
op. �, p. 133 •
B ntos,
·

Ibid. pp. 134-. 35.
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not reach Colonel Toro at Picuiba until 8 A. M. of the morning of
the 15th.

Reacting immediately, he dispatched the 2nd Cavalry

,..,,

north to Canada Oruro as a holding force, and dispatched the remaining two regiments of the 10th Division by motor truck to reinforce

,,

the eroded garrison of Ballivian hoping to stave ·off the fall of that
key strongpoint.

l

It is approximately thirty miles from Picuiba to

�alli vian over a single-track, deeply-rutted trail which slowed the
reinforcement convoy appreciably, preventing its arrival at the
beleagured fortfn until 11 :30 A.M. on the 16th.

2

Hard on its heels

came the advancing Paraguayans, racing by forced marches to cut
the Villa Montes road and block the withdrawal of ll Corps. Marching
parallel to the Paraguayan line of attack was a composite Bolivian
force racing to reach Ccmada Chile, a water hole on the Villa Montes
road, before the 2nd Paraguayan Division arrived and blocked its
access to safety.

It consisted of the 50th Regiment of the 10th

Division, the 2nd Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment {also of'
the 10th), and a battery of Schneider 75 1 s drawn from the 7th Artillery Regiment, which had been in position at Huanci to the northeast
and had withdrawn westwards toward the road on the 14 th for fear
of being outflanked.
1
2

3

The 2nd Division attempted to block this groups

lbid.
Ibid.

3
Ibid., pp. 153-54.
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line of march with mortar fire and ambushes, but was repulsed by
heavy A. A. C. 105 1 s and the Schneiders of the attached battery
which fired point-blank against Paraguayan roadblocks, limbered
up, and moved on.

1

Aided by such close support, the 50th and its

auxiliaries ·reached ca';ada Chile at 2:40 on the·afternoon of the 16th,

-

where it was evacuated by motor transport north to Canada Oruro.

2

-

The 2nd had lost the footrace, and missed another golden opportunity
by failing to bring the road at the bottleneck of Canada Chile under
artillery and mortar bombardment.

Paraguayan aerial reconnaissance

planes had reported that the macadam track and side trails at that
point were jammed with trucks, carts, towed fieldpieces, and
/
columns Qf men withdrawing from Ballivian, which were sitting
ducks for the 2nd' s artillery, now within firing range.

Ortellado,

however, decided that cutting the road was more important than
bombarding it, as divisional ammunition reserves were beginning
to run low, but had he chosen to do so, the majority of II Corps
motor transport and field artillery would have not escaped across
the Parapit(to fight another day.

3

At any rate, the 2nd 1 s infantry

spearheads reached the road at 4:00 P.M. on the afternoon of the

l Ibid.
2
3

Ibid .
Ibid.

16th, and closed it to traffic with flanking roadblocks.

l

✓
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Ballivian

was now totally encircled, without hope of relief, and the decimated
garrison had little prospect of breaking out of the trap, unless they
chose to cross the river and be interned in neutral Argentina.

The

· cornered re·mnants of II Corps had only three days ammunition left,
and the stockade's well was slowly running dry through constant usage
by the excess of men and animals crowded into the narrow perimeter. 2
· Without munitions or water, a prolonged resistance was out of the
question.

On November 18th, the white flag was run up over the

stockade's walls, and the instrument of surrender was signed by
representatives from ll Corps, Franco, and Garay.

Forty-eight

hundred Bolivian officers and men, including the entire Corps headquarters and staff, marched off to POW compounds, bringing the
prisoner total for the campaign to over ten thousand. 3 With the
capitulation, I Corps took possession of thirty-six mortars, twentyeight howitzers and fieldpieces of varying caliber, seven hundred,
four rounds of mortar ammunition, one thousand, two· hundred

4
seventy-two rounds of artillery ammunition, and forty-four trucks ..
The path northwards was no longer obstructed.
l
2

Ibid.
Ibid.

'

3Ibid. , p.
162.
4
Ibid., p. 164.
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Some of the· elements of II Corps had escaped prior to the
surrender, including most of its motor transport and artillery

-

components, which had pulled out for Canada Oruro on the 14th.
One of these miscellaneous fragments drawn from the 9th Artillery
regiment was a two-gun section of Vickers 75's from Battery F of
the 1st Battalion,

1

which had the unique distinction of being the last

unit to depart from El Carmen before the 9th Division's capitulation.

,,

.

Lt. Colonel Arturo Nataniel, commander of the Ninth Artillery,
revealed to Britos in a post-war interview that the entire battery
was ordered to pull up stakes on the morning of the 15th, when the
word was received that the fortin had fallen the previous day.

Load-

ing the dismantled guns, ammunition, and personal gear on two
divisional trucks, the battery departed for the north and C�ada
Oruro via the Seleck trail.

2

Upon arriving at this point, two of

the four guns were dispatched south to Ballivian on the 16th, where
they fell into Paraguayan hands two days later.

The other two field

_,

pieces were transported to the southeast and emplaced at Picada
Murillo to act as the nucleus of a rear-guard roadblock.

This

same depleted section, with varying changes of personnel, served
as part of II Corps rear guard during the entire retreat north to
�

.

the Parapiti, until the lines were stabilized in January of 1935.
1

Ibid., pp. 137-38

2

Ibid.

3
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Artillery usage in the Chaco War had come full cycle with this hasty
employment of trained gunners as a last-ditch delaying force.

The

time they purchased for the Bolivian Expeditionary forces, together
with terrain changes, slowed the rapid pace of the Paraguayan advance
on Villa Montes to a crawl.

✓,

By the end of November, the Parapiti

had been crossed, and Paraguayan patrols skirmished with the 2nd
Bolivian cavalry on the outskirts of Villa Montes,

1 but national

endurance on both sides had reached its limits, economically and
physically.

Men would still die, and battles would still be fought,

although the object of conflict had long been bypassed.
Neither of the belligerents was in fit shape to carry the conflict over into the approaching new year of 1935.

Paraguayan man-

power reserves had been depleted by the strenuous campaign against
Villa Montes, with nearly two thousand casualties piling up in a
month's time (dated from February 18th, .1935).

2

When the with•

drawal had been completed, the conflict, for all practical purposes,
ceased.

Both armies stood poised on opposite sides of the river,

exhausted by three years of continual warfare and a harsh, unrelenting climate which bred disease and starvation.
1

Even after the toppling

The New York Times, November 23, 1934, p. 10.

--- ----

21

---- ------

Chaco War In Military Eyes, 11 Literary Digest, CIX
(March ;�2,, 1935), 16.
1

of the Salamanca government in February of 1935 !

l
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public opinion

in Bolivia favored the continuance of the conflict, in spite of the
opposition of General Penaranda, who maintained his ground forces
could no longer sustain offensive or defensive operations.

The Para

guayan government, realizing the debilitated state of its own military
establishment, was more willing to negotiate for an armistice until
a permanent territorial settlement could be decided upon.

Cajoled

by a six-nation peace commission made up of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, Peru, and the United States, the interim military
regime in La Paz acceded after considerable procrastination, and
signed the armistice agreement on April 5th, 1935.

2

The front lines

from the Pilcomayo to the upper Paraguay suddenly became strangely
silent as the cough of the mortars was stilled, and the cannon's bark
muzzled by tarpaulin and cosmoline.

The verdant brush and savannas

of the Chaco would bear the marks of their passing for many years
to come, in shell-pitted fortines overgrown with acacia and thorn1
in the rusty wire used by ranchers for penning their cattle, and in

�
the rows of ill-tended wooden crosses at Nanawa and Ballivian where
friend and foe lie side by side.

1
2

Ibid. , p. 228.
Ibid., p, 238.

V.

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS IN RETROSPECT
By present-day standards, the field artillery and mortars

used by the Chaco belligerents were limited in technical efficiency,
accuracy, and effectiveness of co-ordination with other service
arms, particularly the respective infantry establishments.

How-

ever, the conflict in which they were employed was hardly a textbook
example of modern warfare.

Both armies, on many occasions, dis-

carded the principles of orthodox artillery and mortar tactics and
fought literally by instinct, and in conformity to a hostile environ
ment.

It is well worth noting at this point that a similar situation

confronts the United States in South Viet Nam at the time of this
writing, only on a more expanded scale and of a more irregular
character.

Formal doctrine was not completely abandoned, but

merely bent to adjust to the exigencies of the moment, as exemplified by the use of artillery in a rear-guard role during the Bolivian
/
retreat from Ballivian. These factors, plus the obvious implications
of training, terrain, and suitability of equipment, must be c5>nsidered
in analyzing the operations of Bolivian and Paraguayan infantry
support weapons and their total bearing upon the outcome of the war.
Numerical superiority was the sole category in which one of
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the two combatants completely outclassed the other.

Assuredly,

the Bolivian Expeditionary Forces were able to bring to bear a
greater quantity of fieldpieces and mortar tubes for support purposes
through extensive pre-war purchasing and an abundance of financial
reserves, as previously stated.

However, such a disparity in total

weapon strength constituted a Bolivian advantage for only the first
few months of active hostilities, as Paraguayan mobilization at that
juncture was incomplete in regards to both men and equipment.

A

time allowance should be made for the mustering of artillery and
mortar units and the issuance of basic weapons, ammunition, etc.
within the Paraguayan field forces, thus accounting for this temporary
numbers gap.

By the spring of 1932, Paraguayan units had attained

a partial parity with their Bolivian counterparts in terms of operational
fieldpieces and tubes, increasing this parity further by the use of
captured equipment as the conflict moved to the north.

Overall efficiency of Bolivian and Paraguayan artillery and
mortar units left much to be desired when compared with the combined
Allied and Axis effort from 1939 to 1945.

Some of the reasons for

this lack of aptitude have been mentioned in Chapter I, in the sections

.
l
considering terrain handicaps and logis_tical problems, to which a
few casual observation·s should be added here.

1

Supra, pp. 14-17

Of primary importance,
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neither army possessed adequate mechanical or animal transport
designed to carry artillery and mortars, due to material shortages,
the demands of front-line supply, and the poor quality of the Chaco
road and trail network.

Without prime movers, artillery mobility

on both sides was limited by the slowness of mule or horse transport,
thus entailing a loss of valuable time in concentrating divisional or
regimental artillery at a certain point along the lines in readiness
for firing.

The lengthy buildup required by the Bolivian I Corps

prior to the battles of Toledo and Nanawa was in part due to artillery and logistical re-concentration in preparation for the designated
offensive.

Paraguayan field forces encountered similar difficulties

during the latter half of the northern campaigns, especially after
·the crossing of the Pilcomayo.

Mortars presented little difficulty,

as they could easily be dismantled and carried by hand, but transporting a fieldpiece under similar circumstances was a horse of another
color.

Many a gun crew during the course of the war had to resott

to their own strength in hauling and emplacing their cannon, and in
preventing its capture in time of retreat or withdrawal.

The iniquitous nature of the Chaco landscape and climate
seemed to conspire against Bolivian an� Paraguayan gunners with'
out distinction of nationality.

;,
Guarani artillerymen and mortar crews,

to be sure, had fewer difficulties in adapting to a familiar environ
ment, but they suffered no less than their opposite numbers from
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the incessant heat, dampness, torrential autumn rains, insetts,
and disease characteristic of the land between the rivers.

Not

only was the health of the respective artillery and mortar personnel
affected by these factors;

equipment took a beating as well from

mud, dust, and corros�on, leaving whole batteries out of commission
at critical moments.

Main roads and trails frequently were blocked,

even during dry weather, by their narrowness and th� thickness of
foot and cart traffic moving to and from the front lines.

Ammunition,

crews, and the guns themselves often arrived at battery sites
several ho urs after fire missions were supposed to begin, leaving
the infantry shorn of effective support when it was most needed.
Logistical problems grew worse during the rainy season, as welllaid roads turned into impassable morasses, bogging down all vehicular
traffic for weeks at a time.

Even the sure-footed artillery mules

were stymied by the mud as they towed pieces up to the front, forcing the use of shank's mare by the weary gun crews to merely insure
forward progress.

Aerial and ground observation was consistently

hindered by clouds of dust and brush-fires caused by shells in the
dry season, and torrential curtains of rain in the at1:tumn, leaving
artillery and mortar observers literally

11

blind 11 in directing fire

concentrations; a condition which did not lend itself to overall
accuracy by gunners of either side.
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Quality of equipment and training seriously handicapped the
belligerents in the area of infantry support.

The bulk of the field

pieces and mortars on both sides were surplus discards from World
War I, or relatively modern pieces such as the 1927 Schneider 75's
which had not been especially fitted for tropical. warfare either by
weather-proofing or other necessary adaptations.

Most of the guns

i nvolved would be classified as mountain artillery; excellent in
weight and portability but deficient in range and operational simplicity.
Complicated breech mechanisms and sighting equipment baffled
artillerymen of both armies, and necessitated lengthy training to
insure accurate usage.

This involved the expenditure of precious

time, which neither nation could afford to waste in the preliminary
stages of the war.

As far as durability under extreme battlefield

conditions, the newer equipment purchased during the four years
prior to the war stood the gaff well, but pieces of an older vintage,
such as the 1898 Model Krupp 75, broke down frequently and
occasionally caused operational accidents, such as breech explosions,
by their very age.
At the outset of the conflict, each field army possessed a
hard core of trained officers and non-commissioned officers as a
leadership nucleus for their artillery and mortar units.

Thorough

going professionals, these men soon found themselves swamped _by
a wave of untutored enlisted recruits, products of national conscription,
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who had been arbitrarily selected to receive instruction in the
intricacies of artillery and mortar operation.

With time running

short in 1931 and 1932, the best that such professional cadres could
provide was an extremely sketchy course in the rudiments of how
to fire and maintain a piece or tube before their units were thrust
into combat.

Half-trained soldiers and complicated equipment

make a dangerous mixture in any circumstance, and operational
accidents multiplied on both sides.

As casulty figures among the

regulars increased with the progress of the war, stopgap promotions
from the ranks and inexperienced cadets from the national military
a cademies filled their places, leading to a momentary decline in
field efficiency and disciplinary lapses, such as the breaches in
Bolivian firing discipline mentioned in Chapter IV.

l

Battlefield

experience is a hard master, and by the time of the siege of

.,,

Ballivian both infantry support establishments had been hammered
into fairly efficient organizations by the elimination of inexperienced
1

1 deadwood 11

through casualty or transfer.

This process, however

successful, was no substitute for the thorough pre-war training
and careful recruit indoctrination that might have saved time,
material, and lives on both sides of the firing line.

Despite these overriding limitations, both belligerents

l
· Supra., pp. I 107-109.
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excelled at one or more specialties within the field of practical
infantry support, and demonstrated a definite superiority (and
preference) for them on the battlefield. Because of a shortage of
trained personnel and technicians, Paraguayan support doctrine
naturally favored, economical, simple weapons which could be
handled by the average infantryman in the forward trenches with a
minimum of training.

The Stokes-Brandt mortar provided the

ultimate answer, and Paraguayan proficiency with 11 the two-legged
stovepipe", as it was nicknamed, more than made up for the absence
of artillery on several occasions. Stokes-Brandts gave the infantry
their own private artillery with an equal amount of firing punch,
and were the perfect weapons for infiltration tactics, such as those

~

practiced by Colonel Garay at Canada de'l Carmen. As far as the
·Paraguayan field artillery was concerned, the major effort was de
voted to the perfection of open-sight firing tactics, which presented
definite hazards to the relatively unprotected crews, but provided,
the advantages of point-blank accuracy and target visibility.

In one

/

sense, Lt. Baez's handling of his guns at Toledo is an example of
the preceeding reference,

l

and one reminiscent of the Union artil-

lery at Malvern Hill during the Peninsular Campaign of 1862 in our
own Civil War, in its use of open-sight. concentrations against attacking infantry.
l

From the standpoint of reconnaissance, Paraguayan

Supra., p. ·92.
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observers outclassed their opponents in the construction and concealment of tree platforms, daringly emplacing them within enemy
lines and calling down fire seemingly from nowhere, as was suecessfully done at Arce in 1932.

It is apparent from the total picture

of Paraguayan artillery and mortar operations during the war that
a premium was placed upon simplicity, mobility, and conformity
to the demands of a known region, which was treated with respect
as an informal ally.

No attempt, formal or otherwise, was made

by Estiggarribia and his associates to· gain primacy in weight of
metal or accuracy in indirect fire, as such advantages would be
impossible in view of the existing financial and technological considerations.

Bolivian superiority rested in observational equipment and
in the relative accuracy with which indirect, ranged fires could be
delivered as a result.

Modern communications equipment, in the

form of the wireless radiotelephones used by Bolivian artillery spotters,
plus the use of aircraft for directing the fall of shot, made it possible
for Bolivian artillerymen to accurately hit a generalized target area
and assure its partial destruction on nearly every occasion.

The

clearing of the outer trench at Nanawa _and the box-barrage "trap"
laid for part of the Paraguayan 2nd Division at El Condado are illustrative cases in point.
l

1

In both of these instances, fire control was

Supra., pp. 103-105.

. 121-22.
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provided by radiotelephone observation on the ground, but aerial
spotting assumed the burden of observational duties throughout the
siege of Nanawa up to the fatal day of July 4th.

As previously re

lated, the system broke down when pin-point accuracy on single or
moving targets was required, although this difficulty was common
to each of the contending armies.

Novel usage of weapons is evident

in the attempts to utilize the Vickers 65 mm. howitzer in mobile
support of advancing infantry at Toledo and Nanawa.

Because of

lack of co-ordination with the infantry and the absence of protective
shielding to cover the gun crews, this promising effort, soon to be
an integral part of Blitzkrieg tactics, died aborning.

Adherence to

the concept of accuracy by weight of fire and observational superiority
were the cornerstones of Bolivian infantry support operations, but
could not insure a final victory.
Outside the battle zone, a number of internaticn al organizations
and states watched the conflict with interest for a variety of reasons,
self-interested or altruistic.

The attempts of the Pan-American

Union and the League of Nations to bring about an arbitrated settle
ment of the dispute have been briefly referred to in the introduction,
and will not be analyzed here, as they �ie outside the context of the
discussion.

It is worthy of no t e , however, that the League's

failure to effectively intervene and thus halt the hostilities permanently
provided conclusive proof of its weakness as a peace-keeping organ.
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The military aspects of the war, from 1932 onward, were carefully
followed by a number of observation missions drawn from representatives of the United States, Germany, Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, and the Latin American republics of Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile.

1

For the European powers and the United States, the

impact of the conflict was not as profound as might be expected,
although some of the assimilated material probably found its way
into the respective War Plans offices of these nations for instructional
purposes or into specificed archives as legitimate military history.
No far-reaching changes in strategy or tactics were made as a
result of these observations, although some of the techniques
developed for the handling of artillery and mortars in a tropical
climate would eventually come into play in the Southwest Pacific
and Burma during World War II as an indirect result of their employ.'..
ment to the Chae o .
Latin American observation and direct participation in the
conflict was more apparent and had more immediate consequences
for the three nations previously designated.

At the commencement

of hostilities, Chile had dispatched a field mission of seventy-five
commissioned officers to Santa Cruz to act as a training cadre and
as volunteer replacements for Bolivian officers killed or wounded
in battle.
l

Colonel Vicuna, the unfortunate goat for the Bolivian

------ -- ---

David H; Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War, p. 41.

defeat at Toledo, was the mission's commander.

1
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Idealism was

hardly at the root of this gesture by the Chilean government. Battle
experience and information on weapons and tactics were the primary
objectives in this case.

Brazil and Argentina did not dispatch con-

tingents to either belligerent to take an active part in the fighting,
choosing to maintain covert neutrality instead.

However, the

Argentine Defense Ministry deployed a large observation force
near Yrendague in the Argentine Chaco from March of 1934 to the
war's conclusion.

2

Composed of five thousand infantry supported

by cavalry, engineer, artillery, and air detachments, this group,
equivalent to a corps in relative strength, was ostensibly present
to prevent violation of Argentine territory by one or both of the
belligerent armies crossing the Pilcomayo.

3

Brazilian ground

forces and naval patrols were also reinforced in the upper reaches
of the Paraguay River, especially after several Bolivian aircraft
mistook a Lloyd Brasilero steamer, the Paraguay, for a Paraguayan

,,,

gunb�at and heavily strafed her near Puerto Murtinho on Novem4
ber 29th, 1934.
With grandstand seats for the action, these frontier
1
Ibid., p. 43.

2
11Battle Of 100 Hours Ends,
(April 28, , 1934), 15.
3

4

11

Literary Digest, CXVII

Ibid.
The New York Times, November 30, 1934, p. 1.
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forces lost little time in grasping the significance of the Chaco
fighting, particularly concerning the l1se and misuse of artillery
and mortars.

l

Their observations were no doubt supplemented

by the reports of the official military missions present on either
side of the front lines, and jointly filed with their respective
defense ministries for future reference.

There has been prior

speculation that the presence of such large, well-equipped contingents on the neutral sides of the Paraguay and Pilcomayo indicated
that armed intervention on the part of Brazil or Argentina would be
forthcoming when an opportunity presented itself, such as the weakening of one of the warring nations.

It is difficult to confirm or

deny such speculation in view of the existing accounts, although
Argentina's diplomatic attitude showed her to be plainly pro-Paraguayan and Brazil was at best lukewarm towards the Bolivian claims
on the Chaco.

Regardless of these considerations, neither nation

made a hostile move, and the frontier forces contented themselves
with watching the conflict roll northwards.

At the domestic level,

their recorded impressions produced significant results in financial
allotments for military spending, purchase of arms _overseas, and
national planning for future military conflicts.

For instance, the

Brazilian military budget in 1934 was doubled from its previous
figure of two hundred million cruzeiros, with a sizable portion of
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the funds being alloted for the purchase of light artillery, communications equipment, mortars, and allied items.

1

Within the respective

armed forces establishments, standardization of fieldpieces and
mortars was speeded up, and new training manuals covering operations in irregular terrain were hurriedly developed.

Standardization

became so much the order of the day that by 1935, all three nations
had adopted the Stokes-Brandt mortar as their prime weapon for
close support of the infantry.

2

In comparison with current efforts

to bridge certain technological gaps within a modernized army, this
somewhat frantic re-tooling might seem wasteful in view of the
support weapons the present-day infantryman has at his command.
To the ABC powers, however, such. re-emphasis was vital at that
moment. They had no means of predicting if the war in the Chaco
might spill over the natural barriers of the two rivers, and decided
that a little preparation would go a long way towards preventing their
unwitting entry into the conflict, or towards bringing it to a quick·
conclusion should they be forced to enter the arena.
The lessons learned in the Chaco, irrespective of the accentuated primacy of the infantry in tropical warfare, still point to one
indisputable fact; namely, that support.fires of a heavier variety
1
The New York Times, November 28, 1934, p. 12.
2

,,
Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 34.
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than carried by small arms are necessary even under adverse
conditions of terrain and climate.

There is no refuting the obvious

contention that field artillery, mortars, and allied weapons played
a secondary role in a conflict undreamed of by theoreticians of the
stature of Clausewitz and Foch. Certainly, the standards of
murderous efficiency established in World War I were not met in
the Chaco, despite the high casualty rates suffered by both sides.
Arthur T. Watkins offers an explanation for this phenomena, when
he states that:
The mortality per cent of the fighting troops
is considerably higher than in the Great War, being
about one in five as compared with one in eleven.
This is not caused by any superior engines of destruc
tion that have been invented in the last decade of
progress, for no weapons of any importance are
employed in the Chaco which were not in use during
the Great War, while many, such as tanks, gas, and
heavy artillery, are impractical and seldom or
never used. It is the deadly climate, the mosquitoes,
and the bad water that send up the death toll, coupled
with the fact that primitive medical arrangements
and difficulty of transport made recovery from even
a slight wound an...event. 11
11

1

The see-saw nature of the conflict, with its emphasis upon
strategic position and .limited freedom of troop movement, forced
planners and commanders of both armies to drastically alter the
traditional doctrines concerning artill�ry and mortar usage left
1
Arthur T. Watkins, 11 The Chaco War,
Review, CXLVll (May, 1934}, 590.

11

Contemporary

154
behind by the departed foreign advisory missions in order to meet
the problems posed by a difficult environment and achieve their
desired objectives.

Immediate amendment of these principles by

the Paraguayan armies did not insure immediate success in the
field, but proved to be the first step in that direction. The unwil-

-

lingness of Bolivian field commanders such as Toro and Penaranda
to scrap the outmoded German system, even after Kundt 1 s demise,
the drawn-out, agonizing failure of their field forces to

foretold

conquer the Chaco, or to even hold what had been seized and
developed.

In a lecture to the Cadet Class of 1943 at the National Military School in May of 1939, Estigarrib1a, newly-made a Field
Marshal, stated the reasons for the underdeveloped state of
Paraguay 1 s artillery at the beginning of the conflict as being ones
of technical deficiency and high cost. In conclusion, however, he
remarked:
"It is evident, nevertheless, that for the
reason of the potency of its projectiles, the
artillery ought not to be depreciated. 111
From a modern vantage point, these words appear slightly
dated in the era of nuclear confrontation, where the modern artillery of the Marshal 1 s day has been sup planted by a variety of
missiles, ten times as destructive as a 75 mm. howitzer firing
1

Decoud, op. cit., p. 17.
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point-blank over open sights.

As in the Chaco, the military

establishments of the entire world have encountered numerous
situations in the past twenty years where unorthodox use of simple
weapons was essential.

A guided missile or jet bomber can be used

against industrial complexes or large, unshielded troop concentrations,
but what value does it have against strongpoints deep in a rain forest
or scattered throughout a mountain chain?

Conventional field artil

lery and mortars must' still fulfill this mission in regular warfare,
or in informal, guerilla-type situations.

Past experience in China,

Malaya, Algeria, Sinai, and now Viet Nam has demonstrated that
even the most fanatically dedicated irregulars cannot hope for tactical
success against regular troops without the assistance of portable,
heavy-caliber artillery, mortars, or recoiless rifles in direct or
indirect support.

To reduce a complex of pillboxes, or destroy a

supply column, simplicity is a basic requirement, not technical
complication.

Competently-handled, mobile artillery and mortar'S

are capable of performing tasks such as these, without resorting to
heavier forms of support.

Considerations. of cause and chronology

aside, the rule of thumb illustrated by the infantry support units of
Bolivia and Paraguay in the hell that was the Chaco are obvious.

In

fantry in any circumstance may take the high ground and hold it for
an indefinite period, but the taking and holding must rely upon sup
port from another source, whether it be mortars or missiles.
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NOTE ON MAP, PHOTO, AND STATISTICAL SOURCES
The maps used within the text were derived David H. Zook's
volume on the military aspects of the Chaco War.

Map I can be

found in the frontispiece of this work, and Map ·u on Page 87.
Statistics and photographs of the primary infantry support
weapons used by both armies were derived from Enrique Vidaurre 1 s
work on the munitions used in the Chaco.

The statistical infor-

mation may be found on pages 146, 147, 148, 152-62, 172-75, and
214-23.

The photographs and two ink sketchs were reproduced by

Xerox copying, and are located on pages 144, 176, 178, 214, 216,
and 220.
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TECHNICAL DATA ON THE INFANTRY SUPPORT
WEAPONS USED BY THE CHACO BELLIGERENTS
I.

THE STOKES-BRANDT 81 MM. MORTAR:
Assembled Weight -- 64.0 kilograms
Weight of Tube -- 20 kilograms
Weight of Tripod -- 18 kilograms
Weight of Base Plate -- 22 kilograms
Aceessory Weight -- 4 kilograms
Effective Trajectory -- 70.2 millimeters
Projectile Range (-w/normal 3300 kg shells) -- 3,000 yards
(w/supercharged 6500 shells) -- 4,500 yards
Shell Velocity -- 30 revolutions p�r minute

II.

THE A. A. C. 105 MM. MORTAR:
Assembled Weight -- 58. 5 kilograms
Weight of Tube -- 29.5 kilograms
Weight of Base Plate and Tripod -- 24 kilograms
Accessory Weight -- 5 kilograms
Effective Trajectory -- 68.5 millimeters
Projectile Range (w/ A. A. C. common) -- l, 500 yards
(w/supercharged) -- l, 650 yards
Shell Velocity -- 20 revolutions per minute

III.

THE VICKERS 65 MM. INFANTRY HOWITZER (MODEL 1926):
Weight of Cannon w/Breech and Carriage -- 84. 4 kilograms.
Weight of Breech Mechanism -- 17.2 kilograms
Weight of Carriage -- 2 7.2 kilograms
Weight of Barrel ---39. 9 kilograms
Length of Barrel -- 1128: 9 inches
Carriage Wheelspan -- 221 inches
Caliber -- 65 mm.
Muzzle Velocity -- 18 r.p.m.
No. of Rotating Bands -- ·20
Weight as Mountain Piece (minus louver) -- 204. l kilograms
Weight (w/louver and heavy tires) -- 288. 5 kilograms
Estimated Range -- 2, 760 yards (at extreme elevation)
Approximate Elevation -- 35 to 40 degrees

'
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IV.

THE SCHNEIDER-CREUSOT 75 MM. MOUNTAIN HOWITZER
(MODEL 1927):
Weight of Cann w /Breech and Carriage -- 1850 ki lograms
Weight of Breech Mechanism -- 27. 3 kilograms
Weight of Carriage -- 25 .1 kilograms
Weight of Barrel -- 18. 6 kilograms
Length of Barrel -- 1415 inches
Carriage Wheelspan -- 302 inchesCaliber -- 75 mm. (3 inch)
Muzzle Velocity -- 480 r.p.m.
No. of Rotating Bands -- 24
Recoil Length -- 1,070 mm,
Estimated Range -- 3,451 yards
Maximum Elevation in Train -- 880 mm.
Brake Fluid -- liquid glycerine and distilled water w/borax
Recoil Mechanism Fluid -- Liquid glycerine and distilled
water w / caustic soda.

· V.

THE VICKERS 75 MM. MOUNTAIN HOWIT;ZER (MODEL 1926):
Weight of Assembled Piece -- 3,937 kilograms
Length of Piece -- 241.6 inches
Carriage Wheelspan -- 540 inches
Caliber -- 75 mm. (3 inch)
Muzzle Velocity -- 475 :i;p. m.
No. of Rotating Bands -- 24
Recoil Length -- 1,092 mm.
Estimated Range -- 4,021 yards
Maximum Elevation in Train -- 1,070.6 mm.
Brake Fluid Capacity -- 480 liters
Weight of Piece as Mountain Howitzer -- 876. 3 kilograms
as Field Howitzer -- 1,335 kilograms

VI.

THE KRUPP 75 MM. MOUNTAIN HOWITZER (MODEL 1898):
Weight of Assembled Piece -- 181. 4 kil�grams
Length of Piece -- 1,441 ..5 inches
Carriage Wheelspan -- 482 inches
Caliber -- 75 mm. (3 inch)
Muzzle Velocity -- 478 r. p: m.
No. of Rotating Bands -- 24
Recoil Lc::ngth -- 1,231 mm.
Estimated Range -- 3,435 yards
Maximum Elevation in Train -- 841 mm.

159
VII. THE VICKERS 105 MM. HOWITZER (MODELS BAND C: 1926):
Series B:
Weight of Assembled Piece -- 590 kilograms
Length of Piece -- 2,352.3 inches
Carriage Wheelspan -- 473 inches
Caliber -- 105 mm.
Muzzle Velocity -- 490 r.p.m.
Recoil Length -- 1, 118 mm.
No. of Rotating Bands -- 3 2
Estimated Range -- 1, 021 yards
Maximum Elevation in Train -- 2,205 mm.
Series C:
Weight of Assembled Piece -- 264 kilograms
Length of Piece -- 1,302. 3 inches
Carriage Wheelspan -- 473 inches
Caliber -- 105 mm.
Muzzle Velocity -- 483 r.p.m.
Recoil Length -- 1, 155 mm.
No. of Rotating Bands -- 32
Estimated Range -=- 1,354 yards
Maximum Elevation in Train -- 879 mm.
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PLATE II: Al-:EnICAN AJU,fr\l·1E!{T co;1POIL'\.TIO)r
105l-11'1 l·10RT.A.;1 IN PI11ING POSITION
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PLA'.l.'E III: VIC
IG�:,s 65MN INP
AYTllY HOIHTZim
IN A. 'l'YPICAL BAT
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PLATE IV: SBl'lAI<: 28/201-:M AJ\1\'I-TA.t\'K/
A1,TI-.AIJWR.,\l�T CANl\'"m� IN �L'Hj-:: TRE�CHES
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PLATE V: scmmrD�It-ClmUSO'i' 75MH IIOWI'l'ZEll ·
HODEL 1927
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PLATE VI: SCHN"EIDER-CHEUSO'i' 105NN HO\HTZER
MODEL 1927
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PL.ATE VII: VICiams 105}tl'1 HOWITZER

MODEL 1926 B
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